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PARTICIPATORY LAWYERING & THE IVORY 
TOWER: CONDUCTING A FORENSIC LAW 
AUDIT IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIRGINIA TECH 
SUSAN P. STUART* 
The tragic events at Virginia Tech in 2007 sent a cold wind blowing 
through the halls of higher education institutions: a Virginia Tech student, 
who had fallen through the cracks of the school's mental health services 
and disciplinary procedures, armed himself with firearms and murdered 
thirty-two students and a professor before committing suicide. In the wake 
of that massacre, several states and individual interest groups issued 
reports on campus readiness for similar catastrophes. A consistent theme 
throughout those reports emphasized the necessity for individual 
institutions to review their procedures to deal with campus violence. 
This Article focuses on that institutional review and the role of lawyers 
in assisting colleges and universities in formulating better and more 
comprehensive procedures for preventing campus violence in general, but 
with an emphasis on preventing similar catastrophes, or at worst, 
minimizing their devastation. The lawyer has the best opportunity to assist 
by participating in the process rather than either dictating its conduct or 
reviewing the product after the fact. Preventive lawyering and 
collaborating with the academy are the only successfUl means for 
adequately addressing comprehensive plans that manage the risks raised 
by the needs of the new consumer student and that create a campus culture 
that does not tolerate campus violence. Specifically, this Article 
summarizes how the lawyer's collaboration with the academy should neatly 
incorporate the academic ends of the institution with legal ends that could 
minimize both the harm and the costs of campus violence. 
• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law, 656 S. Greenwich, 
Valparaiso, IN 46383; (219) 465-7996. B.A., DePauw University; M.Ed., Valparatso 
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INTRODUCTION 
The magnitude of the losses suffered by vJctlms and their 
families, the Virginia Tech community, and our Commonwealth 
is immeasurable. We have lost people of great character and 
intelligence who came to Virginia Tech from around our state, 
our nation and the world. While we can never know the full 
extent of the contributions they would have made had their lives 
not been cut short, we can say with confidence that they had 
already given much of themselves toward advancing knowledge 
and helping others. 
We must now challenge ourselves to study this report carefully 
and make changes that will reduce the risk of future violence on 
our campuses. lf we act in that way, we will honor the lives and 
sacrifices of all who suffered on that terrible day and advance the 
notion of service that is Virginia Tech's fundamental mission.' 
A catastrophe inevitably triggers an audit of the events leading up to the 
calamity for a couple of purposes: to assure that what happened will not 
happen again and to determine who might have been to blame. A review of 
the numerous reports issued in the wake of the tragedy at Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) reveals that 
lawyers must play an integral part in assisting individual colleges and 
universities to conduct those audits and implement the necessary policy 
changes. The purpose of this Article is to focus on the audit as a preventive 
measure in the post-Virginia Tech higher education institution, especially 
in smaller colleges and universities. Lawyers should not necessarily be the 
chief instigators of these audits nor should they perform these audits on 
their own. However. lawyers do have a cooperative and collaborative role 
to play in educating the institutional players, in assessing institutional 
readiness, and in formulating institutional policy to minimize, if not 
prevent, similar catastrophes. 
The goal of such a law audit should focus not just on the campus 
catastrophe but on campus violence in general as the source of the 
catastrophic event. In the ideal situation, the audit would prompt the 
institution not only to update its procedures for threat assessment and 
emergency preparedness, but would also create an overall institutional 
environment that would prevent or at least reduce the causes of, and harms 
I . VIRGil':IA TFCH REVIFW PANEl, MASS SHOOTI'\'GS AT VJRGDJIA TECH: REPORT 
OF THE REVIEW PANEL viii (2007), availah/e at http://www.govemor.virginia.gov/ 
TempContcnt/tcchPanclRcport-docs/fuliRcport.pdf [hereinafter VIRGINIA TECH 
REPORT]; see also VIRGINIA TECH, PRESlDE:-iTIAL 1:-.'TERNAL REVIEW: WORKING GROlJP 
RrPORT ON THE ll\'TERFACE BETWEEN VIRGINIA TECH COUNSELI"t\G SERVICES, 
ACADEMIC AfFAIRS, JUDICIAL AFFAIRS AND LEGAL SYSTEMS (2007), available at 
http://www.vtnews.vt.edu/documents/2007-08-22_intemal_communications.pdf. 
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from, campus violence. Lawyers should participate in this process because 
the law is integral to any discussion of the governance of the institution as 
well as of the considerations the institution must assess when dealing with 
the safety and security of its students.2 Good lawyers are also adept at 
formulating policies for clients that reflect adherence to both the law and 
the character of the institutional client. If nothing else, lawyers are 
essential in assessing litigation risks of which faculty and administrators 
may not even be aware. 
The law audit envisioned here is, at its essence, the melding of the needs, 
character, and talents of the institution with the unique skills of the lawyer 
to negotiate and counsel. The overarching goal is perhaps the essence of 
preventive lawyering but is better characterized here as participatory 
lawyering. The lawyer engaged in the law audit does not hand down edicts 
on finn letterhead but gets down in the trenches as a member of a task force 
or work group, whose responsibility to the group will be to educate herself 
about the educational institution and its needs, to educate the other 
members about the pertinent law, to assist the group in understanding and 
assessing risks involved in campus violence, and to be one of the guides 
through an audit of current procedures, with the ultimate goal of helping to 
create new policy for the institution. 
Such a participatory role for a lawyer is often a difficult one, especially 
for the lawyer who is not in-house with an educational institution. 
Consequently, Part I of this Article discusses the practical necessity for 
lawyers' participation in the institutional task of addressing issues raised by 
campus violence and the collaboration and cooperation skills essential to 
participatory lawyering for a higher education institution. Part II of this 
Article is primarily didactic and is designed to educate about the current 
institutional climate that is affecting not just campus violence but also 
potential "plaintiffs"-victimized students-that a lawyer needs to 
anticipate. Part HT outlines the participating lawyer's educative function on 
a campus violence work group, especially reviewing for the other members 
the risks associated with inadequate prevention and planning. One thing 
lawyers hate to do is to "re-invent the wheel," so previous reports and 
forms are excellent resources to help lawyers assist the group in creating 
templates for the work group's dissection of the institutional policies. Part 
TV guides the collaborative effort by reviewing existing post-Virginia Tech 
audits. Part V selects several topics that figure prominently in these 
existing reports and that should comprise the work group's post-Virginia 
Tech audit of institutional policies and procedures. And Part Vl suggests 
the first steps that a campus must make to embrace a culture of awareness 
2. See. e.g., Jay P. Heubert, The More We Get Together: Jmpro,·ing 
Collaboration Between Educators and The1r l.an)'en, 67 HAR\. Eocc. REv. 531, 532 
( 1997). 
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about the constituent parts of a good campus plan for stemming campus 
violence. Embarking on this effort to reduce campus violence is a 
fundamental mission that colleges and universities ignore at their peril. 
I. JOINDJG THE FORENSIC TEA~ 
Lawyers often have themselves to blame for civilians' antipathy to 
working with them. This dynamic is partially caused by lawyers' not 
wanting to work with others. Instead, they want to dominate the debate. In 
doing so, lawyers often talk past their clients; silence and subordinate 
clients; and dominate the conversation about the clients' problems.3 
"Rather than a lawyer giving voice to or 'translating' for a client, ... the 
lawyer is often seen as unable to hear a client's needs or to respond 
appropriately."~ It should come as no surprise then that higher education 
clients may not be thrilled at the prospect of lawyers' involvement in 
creating campus violence policy: "[T]he [Wisconsin] Governor's remarks 
were remarkably on target in terms of not turning these issues exclusively 
over to lawyers."5 
The unfortunate aspect of the other side of the coin is that higher 
education adminjstrators, and more than likely most academics, are not 
especially attuned to legal issues and are often less well-trained in the law 
and administrative matters than their public school counterparts6 or as 
occurred in the Virginia Tech tragedy, overreact to a misunderstanding of 
the law. Higher education attorneys, at the most, hope for university 
administrators to spot legal issues so that counsel can step in and give 
advice and guidance when needed.7 Large colleges and universities often 
3. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis, & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals 
Within the Aggregate· Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. RI:v. 
296, 379-80 ( 1996) This observation is broad and is not intended to paint all lawyers 
m such an untlattcnng hght, especially lawyers who specialize in representing higher 
education clients. 
4. /d. at 379 (citing Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, 
Representation as Text.· Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORhELL L. 
REv. 1298, 1300-01 (1992)). 
5. WISCO"'SIN OFFICE or JUSTICr ASSIST ANCF & OFFICE OF TilE GOVER>.OR, 
GOVERNOR'S TASK fORCf 0' CA\1Pl 1S SMI::IY: FIML REPORI 63 (2007) (quoting Dr. 
Gary Pave1a), m·ailahle at ftp:, doaftp04.doa.statc.wi.us/doadoc!Jgovemorstaskforce 
campussafetyfinalreport.pdf [hereinafter WISCO"'S!X REPORT]. Dr. Pavel a is himself a 
lawyer, now primarily engaged m academic pursuits at University of Maryland-
College Park. 
6. David Sch1mmcl & Linda Nolan, Academic Administrators, Higher Education 
and the Practice of l'rt'Ventive I.mL 194 EDl 1C. L. REP. 461, 461, 463 (2005). 
Academ1c lawyers can be just as bad as other academics at not being conversant in 
higher educatiOn law and 1ts myriad issues and may be as much a hindrance as a help to 
the university's lawyer. See also Robert M. O'Neil, The La»-·yer and !he Client in the 
Campus Setting: Who h the Client, What Does 1he Client £rpect and flow Ma_1 the 
Attomey Respond?, 19 J.C. & U.L. 333, 340 ( 1993). 
7. Schimmel & Nolan, supra note 6, at 469. 
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have the expertise at hand with in-house counsel, which is budgeted with 
the faculty and staff expenses. Not so with small schools, which not only 
do not have in-house counsel but often must rely on counsel less attuned 
both to the general area of higher education law and to the intricate 
workings of the institution.8 Few resources exist for college and university 
administrators who deal with higher education legal issues, and other than 
the National Association of College and University Attorneys-some of 
whose resources are difficult to access without membership--there seems 
to be no one all-encompassing organization to which colleges and 
universities might subscribe that would give consistent legal guidance on 
campus violence and the law.9 Indeed, the Virginia Tech Task Force 
recommended that national higher education organizations develop 
information-sharing protocols, but, so far, little coordination or cooperation 
on these matters is evident. 10 That leaves the individual institution's lawyer 
with the task of gathering and vetting best practices from meager and 
disparate resources on campus violence. 
The lawyer's underlying goal is convincing the university of the need for 
advance planning and the implementation of risk management protocols for 
campus violence. 11 Such preventive law is the minimization of legal 
8. !d. at 467. 
9. However, one study suggests that higher education administrators would not 
use such associations' legal resources. !d. at 464. Additional member-only resources 
on campus safety are available at the website for the National Association of Student 
Personnel Administrators. See NASPA: Student Affairs Administrators in Higher 
Education, http://www.naspa.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
10. VJRGNIA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 70. The Report names the American 
Council on Education, American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 
American Association of Community Colleges, National Association of State and Land 
Grant Universities and Colleges, National Association of Independent Colleges and 
Universities, Association of American Universities, and Association of Jesuit Colleges 
and Universities. See also Higher Education Associations, http://www.ntlf.com/html/ 
lib/assoc/index.htm (last visited feb. 25, 2009) (providing an extensive list of higher 
education groups compiled by the National Teaching and Learning forum). 
II . The tragic events at Columbine High School were the wakeup call to the 
public schools to embrace legal frameworks for dealing with dangerous students and 
threat assessment and campus security measures that higher education is more slowly 
embracing. See, e.g., HO:N". WILLIA.\1 H. ERICKSON, COLUMBINE REVIEW COMM'N, THE 
REPORT OF GOVERNOR Bill. OWE"'S' COI.UMI31NC REVIEW C0\1MISSIO'J (2001), 
available at http://www.state.co.uslcolumbine/Columbine_20Report_ WEB. pdf 
(herinafter COLUMBINE REPORT); ROBERT A. FEIN, BRYAN VOSSEKuiL, WILLIAM S. 
POLLACK, RA..'IDY BORUM, WILLIAM MODZELESKI, & MARlSA REDDY, U.S. SECRET 
SrRV. & U.S. DrP'T OF EDUC., THRI:.AT ASSESSME 'T IN SCHOOLS: A GLIDE TO 
M~'JAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATI!\G SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES 
(2004), available at http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/threatassessmentguide.pdf 
(hereinafter SECRET SFRVICE GLIDE): MARY ELLEN O'TOOLE, FBI, THE SCHOOL 
SIIOOTER: A THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE (2000), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/school/school2.pdf. Higher education did not seem to 
be as attentive until the catastrophe of Virginia Tech, and the tragedy at Northern 
lllinois University served as a potent reminder. See, e.g., Ted Gregory, 6 Dead in NIU 
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risks. 12 
[P]reventive law works from the premise that preventing legal 
disputes is less costly than litigation. Furthermore, preventive 
law promotes a client-centered approach . . . . In preventive law, 
the lawyer and client engage in a joint decisionmaking process 
regarding legal strategies ... [and] contemplates the client's long 
term goals and interests and how best to achieve them while 
minimizing exposure to the risk of legal difficu1ties. 13 
Preventive law is most successful when the "actor-at-law" recognizes 
that a problem requires legal counsel. 14 Unfortunately, higher education is 
one of those actors-at-law often unable to self-diagnose. Consequently, 
preventive lawyering requires the lawyer's initiative to review the 
juxtaposition of the institution's facts with new developments in the law 
that may have an impact on the institution's law-creating events. This 
practice melds the institution's knowledge of its facts and the lawyer's 
knowledge of the updated law---cases, statutes, and regulations.15 The 
attorney does not do all the work whi1e the client stands by. Instead, such 
preventive lawyering includes the client in collaboration to prevent 
problems. 
Shooting: Gunman Opens Fire in Lecture Hall, then Kills Self, CHI. TRm., Feb. 15, 
2008, at I, available at 2008 WLNR 2984048. Admittedly, there are some distinct 
institutional and legal differences between public schools and higher education that 
make their respective approaches to student safety issues markedly different: public 
schools receive top-down instructions for safety from their schools; public schools are 
better capable of closing their campuses to outsiders; state legislatures regulate the due 
process and safety procedures imposed upon public schools; public schools typically 
have a somewhat higher level of liability for the safety of the students entrusted to their 
care; and the age of the student population in K 12 institutions typically range from 
five to eighteen years. The manner of governance is also different: school boards for 
K 12 institutions will more likely adopt state and federal mandates as well as invest in 
preventive attorney review of their policies to ensure they comply with the letter of the 
law whereas higher education instttutions, even if they have in-house counsel, tend to 
want to over-think their policies, debate them, and chew on them until consensus is 
reached, whtch consensus may have little reliance on legal requirements. See, e.g., 
DCRLK BOK, UNIVERSITIES I THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERClALIZATlON OF 
HIGHER EDUCATI0\1 190 (2003). The events of the past couple of years have, 
assuredly, made preventive law more important to colleges and universities. 
12. Bruce J. Winick, The Expanding Scope of Preventive Law, 3 FLA. COASTAL 
L.J. 189, 189 (2002) ("Through periodic legal checkups, the preventive lawyer ... 
identiflies] potential future legal dilemmas and hclp(s] the client to avoid them."). 
13. Dennis P. Stolle, David B. Wexler, Bruce J . Winick, & Edward A. Dauer, 
integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutrc Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology 
Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL W. L. REv. 15, 16 (1997); cf. O'Neil, supra 
note 6, at 337 ("Most (college and university] issues will be resolved if the attorney 
sees avoidance of litigation as a primary task."). 
14. Louis M. Brown, The Law Office A Preventive Law Laboratory, 104 U. PA. 
L. REV. 940,941-42 (1956). 
15. /d. at 947-50. 
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The success of a collaboration to review and create campus violence 
policies depends upon the nature of the decision-making. Policymaking is 
not always viewed as a lawyer's strength. Lawyers are trained-and often 
cabin off their practices- in two particular functions: counseling the client 
and advocating for the client. These two functions are often seen to be 
strictly within the province of interpreting and explaining the law to the 
clients, a rather one-sided affair. But the skill for counseling is easily 
converted to a policymaking skill if the lawyer is willing to engage in 
dialogue rather than monologue, is able to talk with the client rather than at 
the client. 
institutional in-house counsel, who are often "treating" the entirety of 
the client rather than small discrete parts, arc attuned to this because they 
are attuned to the institution and the community of interests involved: 
Familiarity with the special nature of academic institutions 
and the way they function is a sine qua non of the 
university attorney's role. Universities make decisions 
differently, have unique personnel policies and procedures 
(which often appear byzantine to outsiders), and have a 
culture and value system unlike any other institutional 
client. The lawyer needs to appreciate and understand 
these differences as legal questions arise across the 
campus. There arc, of course, many lawyers and firms 
who handle academic clients as part of their varied and 
general practice. Outside counsel, however, may lack the 
expertise that specialization brings. In such situations, 
universities incur a serious risk by using counsel that is 
unaware of the niceties of tenure, academic freedom, or 
student due process.16 
An attorney working with a university on policymaking issues must attune 
herself to the institution by participating in the decision-making process, 17 
rather than keeping aloof in the traditional counseling function. 
The participatory model that perhaps best describes the most useful 
decision-making process for higher education is deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative democracy has two primary features: dialogue based on reason 
and dialogue based on the public good.18 Dialogue based on reason is an 
engaged discussion in which the parties listen to the viewpoints of the other 
participants to begin shaping the policy then move toward consensus. 19 
16. O'Neil, supra note 6, at 336. 
17. !d. 
18. Jim Rossi. Participation Run Amok: The Costs of \lass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmahng, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 205-06 ( 1997). 
19. !d. at 205; see also Geoffrey Cowan & Arneha Arsenault, Moving from 
Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers ofPublic Diplomacy, 616 
M'<ALS AM. A CAD. POl. & SOC. SCI. 10, 19-20 (2008). 
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"[E]xisting desires should be revisable in light of collective discussion and 
debate, bringing to bear alternative perspectiYes and additional 
information. "20 On the other hand, dialogue based on the public good seeks 
outcomes for the community's interests and not for private self-interest.21 
Such dialogue encourages the debate of competing viewpoints while 
scrutinizing those viewpoints for their salience and usefulness to the 
endeavor.22 
[Deliberative democracy therefore] refers .. . to the 
understanding that in the capacity as political actors, 
citizen and representatives are not supposed to ask only 
what is in their private interest, but also what will best 
serve the community in general-understood as a response 
to the best general theory of social welfare.23 
For the lawyer to successfully negotiate the decision-making, she must 
ingratiate herself with the members of the institution, blending the expertise 
of the practitioner with that of the academic. 24 Collaboration in this context 
is a "process in which two or more persons work and play together to 
achieve some result or create some product in which they are jointly 
invested and about which they care enough to pool their strengths."25 
[In this setting,] individuals adopt not a materially 
calculating posture but rather a richer, more emotionally 
nuanced reciprocal one. When they perceive that others 
arc behaving cooperatively, individuals arc moved by 
honor, altruism, and like dispositions to contribute to 
public good even without the inducement of material 
incentives. 26 
This reciprocity requires an active participation of the parties and may 
come naturally to the academy: "Reciprocal exchange is in fact integral to 
20. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Y·\LE LJ. 1539, 1549 
( 1988). 
21. Rosst, supra note 18, at 206. 
22. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1549. 
23. !d. at 1550. 
24. Nancy Macduff & F. Ellen Netting, Lessons Learned from a Practttioner-
Academician Collaboration, 29 NONPROFIT & VOLUt-.TARY SECTOR Q. 46, 48 (2000). 
"Collaboration" in this context should not be confused with "collaborative lawyering" 
as identifying lawyers collaborating in alternative dispute resolution practice. E.g., Ted 
Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study 111 
Professional Change, 50 ARJZ. L. REv. 289 (2008). Instead, it is probably more akin to 
"collaborative lawyering" as identifying lawyers collaborating for social change within 
communities. E.g., DAVID C. CHRISLIP, THE COLLABORATIVE LEADERSHIP FIEI DBOOK: 
A GUIDE FOR CITIZENS AND CIVIC LEADERS (2002); Ascamo P10melli, The Democratic 
Roots ofCollaborative Lawyering, 12 CU"'ICAL L. REv. 541 (2006). 
25. Macduff & Nettmg, supra note 24, at 48. 
26. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Tntst, Collective Act1on, and Law, 
102 MICH. L. REv. 71,71 (2003) (emphasis in original). 
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the structure of scholarly production.'m Such collective and, indeed, 
collaborative action is premised on trust.28 And trust is something that 
lawyers have to promote actively in order to participate successfully on an 
institutional task force. 
There are a few hurdles to such trust. First, many academics blame 
lawyers for the commodification of the university.29 They view lawyers as 
engaged in the diminution of their importance as educators. Second, 
academics view attorneys as being "risk-averse" and out of touch with the 
university culture. Consequently, they want to form the policies, then 
consult lawyers: "We have to, first off, have a core sense of what we 
believe in, what we're trying to accomplish as educators, defme what we 
want to do, and then approach the lawyers."30 If the potential participants 
on a campus violence task force want to have the dialogue without the 
participation of the lawyers in that process, the stakeholders are not only 
less informed for engaging in the deliberative process, they may be wasting 
their time if the lav.:yer later fmds the policies are legally inadequate or 
even unlawful. Last, as noted above, lawyers arc not terribly good at 
participating. "[L)awyers routinely silence and subordinate their clients 
while purporting to tell 'their' stories."31 Rather than engaging the client in 
a dialogue about the legal problem and the proposed remedies, lawyers 
bind themselves to their own sense of the law and have no "shared 
understanding" of the client's plight or needs.32 
If a lawyer wants to participate in the success of the institutional client, 
she must be invested in the enterprise's goals and success. Public 
education lawyers often have this community of interest because so much 
of what they do involves as much preventive lawyering as reactive 
lawyering.33 Institutional in-house counsel, of course, has this legitimacy 
of working toward a mutual goal, being one of the community. Their being 
on the "premises" and their knowledge of the players gives them insights 
into the academic culture and the spirit of community on the campus.34 On 
the other hand, outside counsel needs to learn to cultivate that academic 
27. /d. at 90. Bur see Heubert, supra note 2, at 563. Reciprocity is also a keystone 
of the dialogue essential to deliberative democracy. Rossi, supra note 18, at 205 n.l78. 
28. Kahan, supra note 26, at 72. 
29. See, e.g., BOK, supra note II, at 6. 
30. W!SCONSI~ RrPORT, supra note 5, at 61~2 (quoting Dr. Gary Pavela, Keynote 
address at the Wisconsin Governor's Task Force on Campus Safety Public Summit 
(Aug. 9, 2007)). 
31. Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: 
Tol.,;ards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 130(}-01 
( 1992). 
32. Jd. at 1301. 
33. See, e.g, MICIIAEL J. l<AliF\1A:'\ & SHERELYN R. l<AUF\.1AN, EDUCATION LAW, 
POLICY, A'.lD PRACTICE: CASES A~D MATERIALS 11- 12 (2005). 
34. Heubert, supra note 2, at 559 
332 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNTVERSITY LAW [Vol. 35, No. 2 
culture and absorb the needs of the community to do the best job of 
collaborating with and within the institutional community, just as one 
might with any other corporate client. 
First, a lawyer working with a college or university needs to understand 
that academics not only specialize in areas with which the lawyer is 
unfamiliar but in an institution that, despite having attended, is still a 
foreign experience to her. A "significant barrier [to academic-practitioner 
collaboration] is the inadequate socialization of practitioners and 
researchers in one another's professional or organizational cultures. "35 The 
lawyer must also acknowledge the "complex educational judgments in an 
area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university" and give "a 
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions."36 Second, the 
lawyer must be prepared to learn the skills of interprofessional 
collaboration and participatory lawyering.37 "One important attitude i!. a 
willingness to collaborate as equals. This calls upon educators and lawyers 
to respect one another as individuals and professionals and to avoid the 
hierarchical relationships that frequently exist between lawyers and their 
clients."3R Third, the lawyer must tap into the skills that each member of a 
work group might have, not just in the institutional sense but in the 
academic sense. "Collaboration is improved if participants are aware that 
each profession has critical knowledge and skills that the other profession 
lacks. Moreover, each professional must be aware of what the other 
professional docs not know.''39 A work group assembled for campus 
violence should include not just administrators, security professionals and 
lawyers, but also gather the expertise that certain of the professoriate would 
bring to the table, like sociology, psychology, geography, education, 
communications, business, and even the physical sciences. Each individual 
could be tasked to bring her expertise to the group-not unlike an 
expertocratic model,40 but instead with the good of the community in mind. 
The community goal is to create a systemic change in the institution--one 
that is more attuned to the legal risks and risk management of campus 
35. Macduff & Netting, supra note 24, at 50. 
36. Grutter v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
37. Heubert, supra note 2, at 562--64. 
38 /d. at 547. 
39. !d. 
40. See Rosst, supra note 18, at 196-98. Task force members of post-Virgmia 
Tech reports halled from several disciplmes. See also CA\1PuS LlFE AND SAFETY A'O 
SF.CIJRITY TASK fORCE, OKlA. STATE REGENTS FOR HIGHER EDLC., FINAl REPORT 3 5 
(2008). ami/able at http:/ www.okhighercd.org/classlfinal-report.pdf [heremafter 
0KLAHO\f\ REPORI); SIAl!:- 01' II I CA\1PUS SECURJTY TASK FORCE., RI:I'ORT 10 THI-
GOVER OR, EXEC'l. liVE Sv\1\1ARY (2008). available at http://W\V\V illinois.govt 
documcnts,CSTF Report_Executive_Summary.pdf [hcremafter ILLINOIS RFPOR 1 
EXECUTrvE SUMMARY); WISCONSI Rl'PORT, supra note 5. at i. 
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violencc.41 
Thus, the participating lawyer has several tasks for working successfully 
with a campus violence task force. On a "molecular" level, the lawyer 
must immerse herself into the institution and submerge the inclination to 
lead the discussion. On the professional level, the lawyer must do what she 
docs best: educate the other members of the group on the law; collate and 
share other preventive law practices; check the institution's existing 
policies; and, if necessary, help formulate new policies.42 
IT. EXAMINING THE BODY IN SITU 
"The scramble to get into college is going to be so terrible in the next 
few years that students are going to put up with almost anything, even an 
education.'>43 
The first thing any lawyer for a higher education institution must do is 
become familiar with its business, its needs, its strengths, and its weakness. 
The only way to engage iii preventive lawyering is to become intimately 
familiar with the institution, or, as a pathologist might do, examine the 
body in place before dissection. Although all attorneys have attended at 
least one institution of higher education and so have some sense of the 
business, that short period of time is insufficient to educate the lawyer 
about the idiosyncrasies of even that institution, not to mention the nearly 
innumerable legal issues the institution faces. 44 Much of the generic legal 
issues can be learned on the job, especially if the relationship is, or will be, 
long term. The same holds true for immersion into a particular institution 's 
culture that an attorney would not really have examined while a student: its 
mission, its past and future goals, and the faculty and staff. For purposes of 
better participating with the university in updating its campus violence 
policies, the astute lawyer should also understand and immerse herself in 
the dynamics of the potential student victims (as well as the potential 
41. See generally Jonathan Simon, In the Place of the Parent: Risk Management 
and the Government of Campus Life, 3 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 15, 36- 39 (1994). 
Incentives to the faculty, especially in the humanities, arc the opportunity to apply their 
skills in the real world, to develop new research queries, and perhaps to develop 
consultancics in campus violence. See, e.g., William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? 
Challenges of Using Expert Testimony on Cognitive Bias in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 377, 397-98 (2003). 
42. Beyond the scope of this Article arc the concerns and considerations of the 
economic and ethical relationship of the attorney to the client. See generally O'Neil, 
supra note 6. 
43. The Professor, T!Ml:, Aug. 29, 1955, available at http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/articlc/0,9171,823895,00.html (quoting Barnaby C. Keeney, former President 
of Brown University). 
44. See WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER 
EDL'CATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL IMPLICATIO\lS OF ADMI:-JISTRATIVE 
DECISION MAKING (4th ed. 2007). 
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student perpetrators) and their relationship to the institution, particularly as 
that relationship has evolved into a commercial business-customer 
relationship. 
The modem college and university governance has become somewhat 
schizophrenic in the clash between the commercialization and 
commodification of colleges and universities and the traditional view that 
colleges and universities are cloistered halls of learning and higher 
intellectual thought. Unfortunately, "[u]niversities share one characteristic 
with compulsive gamblers and exiled royalty: there is never enough money 
to satisfy their desires."45 To satisfy that need for money, colleges and 
universities have long engaged in commercial practices to attract students.46 
However, since the early 1980s, colleges and universities joined the 
mainstream capitalistic drive to compete in the "marketplace" and became 
entrepreneurs.47 Higher education institutions began to snag government 
and grant funding for scientific research, which in tum brought in funds 
from licensing rights, consulting activities, and similar academy-business 
joint ventures.48 
At the same time, US. News & World Report fueled the competition 
among colleges and universities as it published its annual rankings of 
colleges and universities, even their individual professional schools.49 
"Although every college president can recite the many weaknesses of these 
ratings, they do provide a highly visible index of success, and competition 
is always quickened by such measures, especially among institutions like 
universities whose work is too intangible to permit more reliable means of 
evaluation.''50 As a consequence of all this competition, colleges and 
45. BoK, supra note II , at 9. 
46. !d. at 2-3. 
47. !d. at 3-5, 10-13. "Entrepreneurial initiative, h1gh executive salaries, and 
aggressive marketing techniques are aJI spreading to fields of endeavor qUite outside 
the realm of business." !d. at 5. "Some [colleges and universities] have become big 
businesses, employing thousands and coJlecting millions in tuition fees, receiving 
grants from government and private sources, and, for a select few, raising billions in 
huge endowments." STA\LEY ARO"'OWITZ, THE K~OWLEDGE FACTORY: DISMN\'TLING 
THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY AND CREATI'\G TRt:E HIGHER LEARl'II'\G 11 (2000). 
48. BOK, supra note 11 , at 11- 12. 
49. !d. at 14. 
50. !d. The criticisms of these annual reports have generated considerable 
controversy in the academy and not inconsiderable scholarly attention. See, e.g., 
Gordon C. Chang & J.R. Osborn, Spectacular Colleges and Spectacular Rankings: The 
"US News" Rankings of American "Best" Colleges, 5 J. OF CONSUMER CuLTURE 338 
(2005); Symposium, The Next Generation of Law School Rankings and Methodology, 
81 IND. L.J. I (2006); Stuart Rojstaczer, College Rankings Are Mostly About Money, 
SFGATE.COM (Sept. 3, 2001 ), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-binlarticle.cgi?f=/c/a/ 
2001/09/03/ED28864.DTL&type=printable. Ironically, a study commissioned by US. 
News & World Report itself reported significant weaknesses in the methodology used 
in its rankings. Nat'l Opinion Research Ctr., A Review of the Methodology for the U.S. 
News & World Report 's Rankings of Undergraduate Colleges and Universities, WASH. 
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universities go to great lengths to market themselves to students and to 
spend inordinate sums of capital to woo the "best" students. 51 
As students and their parents become targets of that marketing and hence 
consumers of the institutional business, they also start to take seriously the 
business aspect of not just the choice of institution, but what the choice 
should offer in return: the vast majority of undergraduates view a college 
degree as essential to getting a job, a view that far outstrips any other 
reason for attending co1lege.52 "[S]tudents in the 1970s and since have 
viewed college as an absolutely critical screening process which would 
determine where in the economic hierarchy they were likely to end up."53 
In addition, with the rise in the number of nontraditional students-part-
timers, older, or employed--<:ame the rise of a consumer mentality in 
students' relationship with the university: "[t]heir focus is on convenience, 
quality, service, and cost."54 By the 1990s, students became more acutely 
attuned to the buyer-seller relationship they had with the college or 
university, pitting their own interests against the college or university's 
interests and more actively "seeking rights of choice, safety, and 
information,"55 believing that they "have the same rights as consumers do 
with any other commercial enterprise."56 Increasingly, students will lodge 
complaints like customers at a retail store and threaten litigation if they arc 
not satisfied.57 Concomitant with this consumer attitude to their educatiOn 
is the students' view that, just as with traditional businesses, colleges and 
universities have similar business duties to them for their safety on 
campus.58 These safety issues arc the crux of the legal education the 
participating lawyer must convey to the rest of an institutional campus 
violence task force. 
MONTIILY, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2000/norc.html. 
51. See, e.g., WESLEY SHUMAR, COLLEGE FOR SALE: A CRITIQUE OF TilE 
COMMODlFICA TION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 126--41 ( 1997). 
52. ARTHUR LEVI:\E & JEANETTE S. CURETON, WHEN HOPE At\D FEAR COLLIDE: A 
PORTRAIT OF TODA Y'S COLLEGE STUDE:-.T 115-17 ( 1998). 
53. Simon, supra note 41, at 23. 
54. LEVINE & CURETON, supra note 52, at 50. 
55. !d. at 70. 
56. !d. at 52. 
57. Jd. at 51. 
58. Students' attitudes about their responsibilities for their own safety ma} be 
exemplified by a recent article in a maJor university's student newspaper: "It is the duty 
to protect the students of this university, not a favor. College kids do not always take 
the safety precautions necessary, and are probably more irresponsible than most Vvhen 
it comes to the1r own safety." Dan Josephson, Safety Improvements on Campu~ 
Unconvincing, THE DAILY CARDINAL (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 25, 2008, available at 
http://www .dailyca rdi na l.cornlfrontend/article/print_ vers ion/2877. 
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Ill. EXTERNAL EXAMINATIOK AND THE PRE-EXISTING PATHOLOGY 
The attorney's role in the education of the other members of the 
institution engaged in improving campus violence policies includes, to a 
great extent, teaching the teachers. The attorney has to educate the 
academy of the risks the institution faces in matters of campus violence so 
as to better formulate the necessary policies to avoid those risks. In this 
way, the institution becomes preventive rather than reactive to legal issues 
raised by campus violence. That education instructs that, as goes the 
student consumerism in the institution, so goes the law. 
The rise of student consumerism parallels the fall of in loco parentis 
governance in higher education. Until recently, little structural change has 
taken its place as colleges and universities have taken a more market-
oriented, laissez faire approach to governing student social and private 
lives. Unfortunately, the consumer-savvy student has also become more 
litigious, leaving institutions to deal with the disparate demands of the 
students: I am a consumer, and 1 want the best; however, 1 am unwilling to 
take responsibility for the costs of my actions. 59 
That leaves higher education with a new consideration in running its 
business: the role of risk management in minimizing the harms to the 
students without interfering with their private lives. The modem college or 
university now must consider student demands for the ideal in health and 
safety as part of its business plan.60 Rather than directly shaping and 
regulating students' lives under the in loco parentis model, the modem 
college or university must indirectly shape and regulate its students' lives 
as consumers. This requires the college or university to look at the scope 
of actors and actions on its campus and to emphasize the risks and 
environment to the consumers so they can make the most responsible and 
rational choices over health and safety issues,61 rather than submitting to 
the uncontrolled domination of the laissez faire system.62 Jn other words, 
colleges and universities must inculcate in their students a sense of order in 
matters of campus security as responsible consumers rather than either 
extreme of the strictures arising from the imposition of moral authority and 
of the anarchy of no government at all. 
Hence, one major task of the lawyer participating on a campus violence 
task force is to assist the other members in appreciating the importance of 
risk management. This task can be accomplished by supplying the most 
recognizable rationale for creating a campus culture of responsible choices 
and rational consumerism: the not inwnsiderable likelihood that a college 
or university will incur liability for the consequences of not managing the 
59. Simon. supra note 4 I, at 23-26. 
60. /d. at 3 I. 
61. Jd. at 32. 
62. !d. at 38. 
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risks of campus violence, or at the very least, the costs of defending a suit 
by an injured student. 
The task force lawyer-participant brings the expertise to the group that 
educates the other members on those legal concerns,63 which begins with 
the stark fact that courts are increasingly awarding damages to college and 
university students (or their families) when they are injured by violence on 
campus.64 Although the statistics are contradictory, this trend is fed by 
reported data that reveals approximately one-third of college students have 
been campus crime victims65 as well as slightly escalating campus crime 
and violence during the past fifteen years or so.66 Fatal shootings on 
63. SlATE OF ILL. CAMPUS SECURITY TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THI: GOVERNOR, 
225-37 (2008), available at http://www.ibhe.state.il.us CampusSafety/materials/ 
CSTfRcport.pdf [hereinafter ILLINOIS REPORT). 
64. See, e.g., John Wesley Lowery, The Legal Implications of Campus Crime for 
Student Affairs Professionals, in CREATII\G A\JD MATNTATNI~G SAFE COLLEGE 
CAMPUSES: A SOURCEBOOK FOR EVALuATI'\G AND ENHANCING SAFETY PROGRAMS 
205, 213 15 (Jerlando F. L. Jackson & Melvin Cleveland Terrell eds., 2007) 
(hereinafter CRbATI!';G AND MAIN I AI"\Il'\G SAFE COLLEGE CAMPt;SES). 
65. This figure was conststent in both 1989 and 1991 studies of 6,000 and II ,000 
randomly selected undergraduates, respectively. Dorothy G. Siegel & Clarinda Harriss 
Raymond, An Ecological Approach to Violent Crime on Campus, 15 J. SECURITY 
ADMIN. 19, 20 21 ( 1992). Similar statistics existed in 1992. Bonnie S. Fisher, John J. 
Sloan, Francts T. Cullen, & Chungmeng Lu, Crime in the Ivory T011·er: The Level and 
Sources of Student Victimization, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 671,690 ( 1998). 
66. According to available data gleaned from reports of postsecondary campus 
cnme, certain criminal offenses have mcreased in number in the past few years. 
Compare NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CA\IPUS CRI\1E AND SECURITY AT 
POSTSECO'\DARY EDUCATIO~ TNSTITUTIONS {1997), 
http: nces.ed.gov/surveys/peqts/publications/97402/ (stat.Lstics from 1992- 94 ), wit It 
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 0HICE OF POSTSFCO'I,DARY ED"!.JC., TIIF TNCIDI:.:-.CE OF CRI'v!F ON 
THE CA\1PUSES OF U.S. POSTS[(O'\DARY EDLCATION li\STII L fiOXS: A RrPORT TO 
CONGRESS (200 I), m·ailable at http:/iwww.ed.gov/finaid prof'resourcestfinrespl 
ReportToCongress.pdf [hereinafter D.O.E. 2001 REPORT TO CONGRESS], and U.S. 
DEP'T OF EDUC., DATA 0'\ CAMPUS CRI'v!F.: SL\1MARY CRIME STATISTICS FOR 2004-
2006, http://www.ed.gov/admins.rleadlsafety/criminal-04-06.pdf (criminal offenses). 
According to this data, there has been a net numerical increase in violent campus crime 
between 1992 and 2006 although there was a slight decline between 2004 and 2006. 
"Violent crimes" are murder, forcible sex offenses, robbery, and aggravated assault. 
Part of the startling increase seems to be the doubling m the number of forcible sex 
offenses. However, the rncrease in numbers of forcible sex offenses may be a 
correctton in reportmg the types of events that constitute "forcible" offenses because 
reported "nonforcible sex offenses" dropped to almost rul. See also Jcrlando F L. 
Jackson, Melvin Cleveland Terrell, & Rtchic L. Heard, Tire Complexity oj'vfaintaining 
a Safe Campus in lliglter Educatwn: An Administrative Dilemma, in CREA 111\G AND 
MAINTA"ING S \FE COLLI:GI: CAMPusrs, supra note 64, at 3, 6-7 (arguing some 
violent crimes on campus are in decline while others are up); KAPLL'\ & Lrr, supra 
note 44, at 880; VIRGIN1A TECII REPORT, supra note 1, at Ll Lll (Fatal School 
Shootmgs m the United States: 1966-2007). But see Bonnie S. Fisher, Jennifer L. 
Harman, Francis T. Cullen, & Michael G. Turner, Making Campuses Safer for 
Students: The CleiJ' Act as a Symbolic Legal Reform, 32 STETSO' L. R1:.v. 61, 80--81 
(2002) (suggesting that campus crime is declining); J. Fredericks Volkwein, Druce P. 
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campus are definitely on the risc.67 This trend is in contrast to decreasing 
crime statistics in the public schools for the same time period.68 Another 
stark trend is the increased willingness-right or wrong-of the judiciary 
to hold colleges and universities accountable for taking care of their 
students. 69 
College and university students and their families have several avenues 
they pursue when seeking to impose liability upon colleges and universities 
for injuries incurred by campus violence, but they usually choose to pursue 
remedies under state law.70 The past twenty years or so have produced 
increasingly sophisticated methods for holding higher education institutions 
liable for injuries to students.71 Hence, the cautionary role a lawyer must 
play on a campus violence task force. 
The recent successes in court occurred when the plaintiff victims, or 
their families, asserted that the institution has a business responsibility for 
the safety of its students. This business model of litigation should come as 
Szelest, & Alan J. Lizotte, The Relationship of Campus Crime to Campus and Student 
Characteristics, 36 REs. IN HlGHER Eouc. 647 (1995) (concluding campus crime 
decreased between reponing years I 974 and 1992). 
67. INT'L Ass·:-. or CA.'.IPUS L. Er-.FORCE\1ENT AD\11NS. SPECIAL REv. TASK 
fORCE, OVERVIEW OF THE VIRGINlA TECH TRAGEDY AND I\1PLICATIO'S FOR CA.\.fl'US 
SAFETY: THE IACLEA BLUEPRII\'T FOR SAFER CA.\1PUSES 10-11 (2008), available at 
http: www .iaclea.org/visitors/PDFs/VT -taskforce-report_ Virginia-Tech. pdf 
[hereinafter IACLEA BLUEPRINT] A recent white paper from the American College 
Health Assoctat10n suggests that campus violence decreased dramatically by 54% 
between 1995 and 2002. JOETIA L. CARR, AMERICA~ COLL. HEALTH ASS'\1, CA'v!PUS 
VIOLENCE WHITE PAPER 3 (2005). However, the statistics upon which the Campus 
Violence White Paper relied came from Katrina Baum & Patsy Klaus, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Violent Victimization of College Students, 
1995-2002, NCJ 206836 (2005), available at http:. www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf 
vvcs02.pdf, which reported statistics of violent crimes against college students, 
wherever located, not just on campus. As that repon reveals, 93°o of those cnmes 
occurred off-campus. !d. The Campus Violence White Paper's conclusions, however, 
and the position of the American College Health Assoctation on campus vtolence are 
likely unaffected by this variance m evidence. 
68. See N-\T'L CTR. FOR EDliC. SlAT. & BliREAU OF JliST. STAT., lr-.DJCATORS OF 
SCHOOL CRIMF AND SAFETY: 2007 6-7, I 0-1 1 (2007), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/ 
200802la.pdf. 
69. For example, some of the victims of the Vtrgima Tech murders will ltkely 
settle with the state for $11 milhon; the remainder arc free to pursue litigation after 
having filed tort claim~ notices. See Anita Kumar & Brigid Schulte, Shooting Vtcflms • 
Families Tentallvely Back Virgima Deal, WASH. POST, Apr. II , 2008, available at 
2008 WLNR 6742985. 
70. Each state has its own corrunon law rules of ncghgcnce, and when state 
colleges and universities are mvolved, there arc statutory rules of negligence and of 
state-sanctiOned immunities under that state· s tort claims act. See generally KAPLIN & 
LeE. supra note 44, at 880-85; Brett A. Sokolow, W. Scott Lewis, James A. Keller, & 
Audrey Daly, College and University I iabtlity for Violent Campus Aflacks, 34 J.C. & 
U.L. 319 (2008). 
71. See, e.g., Sokolow. Lewis, Keller, & Daly, supra note 70. 
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no surprise, coinciding as it does with the rise of the consumer student. 
One such legal route, although not usually successful to date,72 that seeks to 
hold higher education institutions liable for campus violence is based on 
the contractual obligations undertaken by the college or university on 
behalf of the student and on which a student may rely in entering into the 
agreement to attend the school. An implied contract may arise from the 
pamphlets, brochures, and other documents sent to students when they are 
admitted to a college or university.73 Additional documents, such as 
student handbooks and dormitory policies, might imply a contract for 
students' safety. These contracts, however, go both ways and may require 
that the student herself not have violated their provisions, such as failing to 
abide by contractual procedures.74 
The most successful route for holding colleges and universities liable for 
the safety of their students is through negligence theories.75 In most 
jurisdictions, negligence consists of the elements of duty, breach, 
proximate cause, and injury. When it comes to asserting higher education 
liability, the legal focus is on the duty, if any, owed by the institution to the 
student. Colleges and universities are not generally considered the insurers 
of their students' safety/6 and unlike the duty of supervision imposed on 
teachers in public schools, the duty of higher education institutions relies 
less on a parental role in the protection of its students because they are 
considered "legally responsible adults who are able to take care of 
themselves.'m However, courts are still finding that universities owe a 
duty to their students for third-party campus violence. 78 
72. See, e.g., Furek v. Umv. ofDel., 594 A.2d 506,517 (Del. 1991); Shin v. Mass. 
Inst. of Tech., No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101, at *6--*8 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 
2005). 
73. Nieswand v. Cornell Univ., 692 F. Supp. 1464, 1469, 1470-71 (N.D.N.Y. 
1988) (holding that the parents of student who was shot to death in donnitory had 
created genuine issue of material fact concerning university's contractual obligation to 
student). These documents may create a contract between the college or university and 
the student for purposes of imposing appropriate disciplinary procedures. See, e.g., 
Goodman v. Prestdent & Bd. ofTrs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 40, 57 (D. Me. 2001) (student 
handbook). 
74. Nieswand, 692 F. Supp. at 1471. 
75. See general(v Sharlene A. McEvoy, Campus Insecurity: Duty, Foreseeability, 
and Third Party Liability, 21 J.L. & Eouc. 137 ( 1992). 
76. Schieszler v. Fcmtm Coli., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 610 (W.D. Va. 2002); 
Kleisch v. Cleveland State Univ., No. OSAP-289, 2006 WL 701047, at *6 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 21, 2006). 
77. Furek, 594 A.2d at 517. "The in loco parentis doctrine is outmoded and 
mconsistent with the reality of contemporary collegiate life.'' Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 
861 P.2d 768, 778 (Kan. 1993). But see Jesik v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coli. Dist., 
611 P.2d 547, 551 (Ariz. 1980) ("[A] statutory duty of adequate supervision coupled 
with notice imposed a specific duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the decedent 
[student].") 
78. See generally Sokolow, Lewis, Keller, & Daly, supra note 70. 
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 31579 sets forth the general 
proposition that an actor is not liable for the safety of another from the 
attacks of a third party unless there is a special relationship between the 
actor and the victim. The most widely accepted grounds for higher 
education liability for the safety of its students from third-party violence 
arises from the special relationship between a business owner and its 
customers. One of the most commonly considered higher education special 
relationships is the university as possessor of land.8° Courts view colleges 
and universities as business owners who must extend to invitees on their 
property-students-a degree of care to maintain the premises in a safe 
condition.81 A business owner has a duty to warn or protect individuals 
doing business on the premises-invitees-from the dangerous or criminal 
acts of third persons when the business owner, in the exercise of ordinary 
care, knows or should know that the third person presents a danger to the 
invitcc.R2 Thus, a university has a duty arising from this special 
relationship to protect its students, while they arc on campus, from a third 
person's dangerous or criminal acts.83 
79. RESl ArEMEJI..'T (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 ( 1965) ("There is no duty so to 
control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to 
another unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which 
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special 
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to 
protection.") 
80. RESTATEME~T(SECOND)OFTORlS § 314A (1965). 
81. E.g., Kleisch, 2006 WL 70 I 047, at *3. 
82. RESTATEME~T (SEC0'\10) OF TORTS § 344 (1965) ("A possessor of land who 
holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to 
members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical 
harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons 
or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) 
discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning 
adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against 
it."). 
83. See, e.g., Nicswand v. Cornell Univ., 692 F. Supp. 1464, 1467 ( .D.N.Y. 
1988); Peterson v. S.F. Cmty. Coli. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Cal. 1984) (holding 
that the college had a duty of care to student assaulted in area of campus where other 
assaults had occurred); Furek v. Univ. of Del. , 594 A.2d 506, 520 (Del. 1991); Nero v. 
Kan. Sate Univ., 861 P.2d 768,780 (Kan. 1993); Williams v. State, 786 So.2d 927,932 
(La. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the University of Louisiana at Monroe had a duty of 
care to a student assaulted and robbed at gunpoint in his dormitory room); Stanton v. 
Univ. of Me. Sys., 773 A.2d 1045, 1049 (Me. 2001) (holding that the university had a 
duty to a student-athlete to warn her of procedures for personal safety); Knoll v. Bd. of 
Regents, 601 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Ncb. 1999) (finding that the Uni'\ersity of Nebraska 
owed a duty of care to a student seriously injured during a fraternity hazing incident); 
Aycni v. County ofNru;sau, 794 N.Y.S.2d 412, 413 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (Nassau 
Community College); Kleisch, 2006 WL 701047, at *4 (finding that the university had 
a duty of care for a student raped in a lecture hall by a stranger) ; Butch v. Univ. of 
Cincinnati, 695 N.E.2d 1245, 1247 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1997); Johnson v. State, 894 P.2d 
1366, 1370 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Washington State University owed a 
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Another such special relationship between a college or university and a 
student is the landlord-tenant relationship, especially when the campus 
violence occurs in on-campus residences. This relationship has a slightly 
lower level of care than that owed by a business owner to its invitees. In 
some cases, the landlord's duty of reasonable care to its tenants only 
extends to the common areas, and the landlord must have actual knowledge 
of dangerous or defective conditions.84 The college or university as 
landlord may not be liable for injuries incurred in the actual residential area 
because it is not the common area covered by the duty, nor for third-party 
violence because a violent third party is not generally considered a 
dangerous or defective condition of the premises.85 However, a landlord 
college or university that fails to secure its campus buildings properly may 
be held liable under this special relationship.86 
A third special relationship is one that is created by the college or 
university itself, that of providing campus safety and security. This may 
well be the broadest duty imposed on a higher education institution and 
was first recognized in Mullins v. Pine Manor CollegeY ln that case, the 
court observed that "colleges of ordinary prudence customarily exercise 
care to protect the well-being of their resident students, including seeking 
to protect them against the criminal acts of third parties."88 Viewing 
campuses as a "magnet" for criminal behavior because of the congregation 
of young, generally unsupervised, adults--especially women-modem 
campuses undertake to provide security. Indeed, providing security is an 
indispensable business practice in running a modern college or university 
and ts part of the financial package charged to students. 89 Both parents and 
students rely on that provision of security.90 Having voluntarily assumed 
security as a duty, the college or university must perform that duty with due 
care.91 Liability inures upon the college or university if it fails to exercise 
due care and increases the risk of harm to the student or the student relies 
duty of care to a student abducted and raped ncar her dormitory). 
84 Rhaney v. Univ. of Md. Eastern Shore, 880 A.2d 357, 364 (Md. 2005) 
(holding that the university owed no duty to a student punched by a fellow student 
while in his dormitory room). 
85. Jd at 365 66. 
86. E.g., Miller v. State, 467 N.E.2d 493, 495 (N.Y. 1984). 
87. 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983). 
88. ld at 335. 
89. /d. at 336. 
90. Id at 336 37. 
91. !d. at 335 36. But see Volkwein, Szelest, & Lizotte, supra note 66, at 667 
("[I]t appears that cnme on campus is relatively independent of crimes and poverty in 
the surrounding community. In view of the relatively low rates of campus crime, 
perhaps students are not viewed by criminals as 'easy targets' until they leave the 
campus and enter the community."). 
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on campus security to keep her safe.92 Hence, Mullins created a special 
relationship unique to higher education institutions, imposing specific 
duties because of their relationship to their students.93 One particular 
peculiarity of this duty is that the foreseeability of criminal behavior on 
campus is virtually proved simply by having campus security in place: "the 
precautions which . . . colleges take to protect their students against 
criminal acts of third parties would make little sense unless criminal acts 
were foreseeable."94 
Related to the Mullins principle but more specifically reliant upon the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 32395 is the principle that a higher 
education institution creates a duty when it takes direct responsibility for 
the safety of its students. Unlike the implicit special relationship created in 
Mullins, this relationship occurs if a college or university has direct 
involvement in its students' dangerous activities. If it does, the college or 
university has a duty to control the situation in a non-negligent manner.96 
Not yet a duty imposed on colleges or universities but one that is 
looming on the horizon may be the duty to control the violent student, a 
duty that might be extrapolated from recent cases holding colleges and 
universities liable for student suicides. In 2000, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
determined that the University of Iowa was not liable in a wrongful death 
action for the suicide of a freshman.97 In question in that case was the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323,98 which imposes a duty on one who 
92. Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 336. 
93. "The instant case concerns only the distinctive relationship between colleges 
and their students." /d. at 337. Contra Murrell v. Mount St. Clare Coli., No. 3:00-CV-
90204, 2001 WL 1678766, at •s (S.D. Iowa 2001) (finding that the college was not 
liable for acquamtance rape by a student's guest because it had no way of knowing it 
had to control this individual). ln Murrell, the court stated: "[a] college is an 
educational institution, not a custodian of the lives of each adult, both student and non-
student, \\-hO happens to enter the boundaries of its campus." !d. (citing Univ. of 
Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 62 (Colo. 1987)). 
94. Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 337. "That a sexual assault could occur in a dormitory 
room on a college campus is foreseeable and that fact is evidenced in part by the 
security measures that the University had implemented." Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 
773 A.2d 1045, 1050 (Me. 2001) (citing Mullins, 449 N.E.2d 331). 
95. RESTATEVII:NT(SECO'\D)OFTORTS § 323 (1965) ("One who undertakes, 
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or thmgs, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk 
of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the 
undertaking."). 
96. Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 520 (Del. 1991) (holding that the 
university policy against hazing imposed a duty on the university for the care of a 
fraternity pledge who was burned by lye-based oven cleaner). 
97. Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2000). 
98. RESTATEME.NT (SECOI\0) OF TORTS§ 323 (1965). 
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"undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's 
person."99 Plaintiff father argued that the University had failed to exercise 
reasonable care after his son previously attempted suicide and University 
employees were aware of the attempt yet failed to pursue the matter.100 
The court determined that this duty could not be foisted on the University 
because the employees' failure to act did not increase the son's risk of 
suicide. 101 However, two years later, the personal representative of another 
student's estate survived a motion to d~smiss a cause of action because she 
asserted a special relationship between the College and the student 
sufficient to impose a duty to protect him from committing suicide. 102 That 
special relationship arose because the student lived on campus and the 
College was aware that he had emotional problems. Based on the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 314A,103 the generic principle was that a 
duty to protect arose from a special relationship created by the College's 
knowledge that the student was troubled and the facts that established his 
suicide were foreseeable. 104 
In 2005, one court raised the specter of multiple grounds for university 
liability for a student's suicide in Shin v. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. 105 Elizabeth Shin had pre-existing mental health issues upon 
matriculating at MIT, mental health issues that became increasingly 
pronounced as her freshman and sophomore years progressed. Various 
MIT employees and administrators, including psychiatrists at its Mental 
Health Service Department, met with, treated, and counseled Shin to deal 
with her problems. By spring of her sophomore year, she had made 
numerous suicide threats for which MIT offered a variety of responses. 
She eventually set herself on fire in her dorm room and died. 106 Shin' s 
parents filed a multi-count complaint against MIT and successfully 
presented triable issues of fact to overcome a motion for summary 
judgment filed by MIT administrators107 on claims of negligence, gross 
99. Jain, 617 N.W.2d at 297 (citing RESTATEMENT {SEC0.:\0) OF TORTS § 323 
(1 965)). 
100. /d. at 299. 
101. Id. 
102. Schieszler v. Ferrum Coli., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314A (1965); Schiesz/er, 236 F. Supp. 2d 
at 606-07. 
104. Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 609; see generally Carrie Elizabeth Gray, Note, 
The University-Student Relationship Amidst Increasing Rates of Student Suicide, 31 
LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 137 (2007). 
105. No. 020403,2005 WL 1869101, at *l (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 2005). 
I 06. /d. at *1-*4. 
107. Shin's parents also survived summary judgment in claims against the MIT's 
individual med1cal professionals involved in the matter for claims of gross negligence. 
The gross negligence count averred that the medical professionals did not formulate nor 
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negligence, wrongful death, and conscious pain and suffering. 108 
The duty necessary to support allegations of each of these four torts was 
extrapolated from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A, recognizing a 
special relationship between the University and Shin arising from a "duty 
to aid or protect in any relation of dependence."109 According to the court, 
this duty arises when an individual "reasonably could foresee that he would 
be expected to take affirmative action to protect the plaintiff and could 
anticipate harm to the plaintiff from the failure to do so."110 The court then 
ruled that the MIT administrators-Shin's dormitory Housemaster and the 
Dean of Counseling and Support Services-were well aware of Shin's 
mental problems and could have foreseen that she would likely hurt herself 
without appropriate supervision, thereby creating a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to prevent harm to Shin. 111 The MTT administrators 
breached that duty when they failed to create an intervention plan to protect 
Shin from hurting herself, despite the escalation of her suicide threats. 112 
The Shin decision should be especially frightening for college and 
university administrators because of the natural progression by which a 
court could extend the duty of care that administrators may have to suicidal 
students to a suicidal student's victims, as occurred in the events at Virginia 
Tech. If a special relationship exists between a college or university and a 
suicidal student to protect the student from himself, under § 314A, it is no 
great leap of logic to extend that to the duty to protect others from the 
suicidal student under Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 319, which imposes 
a duty on those who take control of a third party with dangerous 
propensities. 113 If a college or university undertakes to control a suicidal 
enact a plan to respond to Shin's suicide threats. !d. at *8-*9. 
108. ld.at*ll. 
109. !d. at *12 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECONTI) OF TORTS§ 314A (1965)). 
110. !d. (quoting Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1300 (Mass. 1984)). 
Ill. ld.at*13. 
112. !d. at *14. Shin's parents ultimately settled the case with MlT, both parties 
agreeing that her death was probably an accident. Toxicology reports indicated that she 
had taken a nonlethal dose of nonprescription drugs and was likely unable to respond 
when candles sparked the blaze. Marcella Bombardieri, Parents Strike Settlement with 
MIT in Death of Daughter, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 2006, at Bl , available at 
http :1/www .boston. com/news/! oca 1/articl es/2006/04/04/parents_strike_settlement_ with 
_rnit_in_death_of_daughter/. 
113. RESTATEMEI\T (SECO~D) OF TORTS § 319 (1965)("0ne who takes charge of a 
third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily hann to 
others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third 
person to prevent him from doing such harm."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS§ 41 (Proposed Final Draft No. I 2007). But see Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 861 
P.2d 768, 779 (Kan. 1993) (finding that the university did not have control over student 
who sexually assaulted another sufficient to impose liability under § 319 simply 
because it had charge of his housing assignment); Eiseman v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 
1137 (N.Y. App. 1987) (holding that the state university had no duty to control student 
that it knew was a former convict and former drug addict and was therefore not liable 
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student who decides to take others with him, Shin might stand as authority 
for making the college or university, or at least the specific administrators, 
liable for harm to the suicidal student's victims. 114 The fluidity by which 
courts are morphing otherwise static special relationships, such as business 
owner-invitee and landlord-tenant, to a more generic dependency special 
relationship is not inconceivable: "[a]s the harm which safely may be 
considered foreseeable to the defendant changes with the evolving 
expectations of a maturing society, so change the 'special relationships' 
upon which the common law will base tort liability for the failure to take 
affirmative action with reasonable care. "115 
If the duty to the student does not trap the college or university, the 
foreseeability of the violent act may do so. 116 First, in relationship to 
danger on campus, students must be protected from physical conditions that 
encourage crime: 
[i]n the closed environment of a school campus where students 
pay tuition and other fees in exchange for using the facilities, 
where they spend a significant portion of their time and may in 
fact live, they can reasonably expect that the premises will be 
free from physical defects and that school authorities will also 
exercise reasonable care to keep the campus free from conditions 
which increase the risk of crime. 117 
As a campus task force examines the ways to minimize harm, those 
physical locations that portend danger- stairwells and campus walkways 
without lighting, locations of earlier violence-must be dealt with. 
Perhaps more important (and more unpredictable) are the acts and their 
actors. Regardless of how they themselves behave, students expect that 
campuses will exert a certain amount of control over third-party conduct. 
Sudden and unexpected acts are often excepted. 118 However, harm may be 
for off-campus rape and murder offellow student). 
114. See Jim Castagncra, Legal Liability for the Virginia Tech Massacre: Inquiry 
Questions Clio's Mental-Health Care History, TilE GREENTREE GAZETrE, May 2007, 
available at http://www.greentreegazette.com/Specia1Series/load.aspx?art=238. The 
Proposed Final Draft of Restatement (Third) of Torts§ 4l(b)(4) specifically imposes a 
duty of reasonable care on mental-health professionals for the safety of third persons 
from risks posed by their patients. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) or TORTS § 4l(b)(4) 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2007). 
115. Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1300-01 (Mass. 1984). In addition, 
the Proposed Final Draft of Restatement (Third) of Torts § 40 (2005), creates a specific 
duty between schools and students. RESTATfMENT {TliiRD) Of TORTS § 41(b)(4) 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2007). Such a rule, if applied to higher education 
institutions, would have a profound impact on the liability of colleges and universities 
to their students for campus violence. See Sokolow, Lewis, Keller, & Daly, supra note 
70, at 323-24. 
116. See Sokolow, Lewis, Keller, & Daly, supra note 70, at 325-27. 
117. Peterson v. S.F. Cmty. Coli. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193, 120 I (Cal. 1984). 
118. E.g., Luina v. Katharine Gibbs Sch. N.Y., Inc., 830 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (N.Y. 
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foreseeab le when a college or university has attempted to control the 
dangerous activity by providing security or otherwise attempting to 
regulate the conduct. 119 A similar crime by an individual may create 
sufficient foreseeability of the second crime to impose liability on a college 
or university. 120 However, the foreseeability need not be attached to a 
particular individual; the occurrence of similar activities may be sufficient 
to create foreseeability of later acts of violence. 121 "[P]rior criminal 
activity need not involve the same suspect to make further criminal acts 
reasonably foreseeable for purposes of imposing a duty ... to undertake 
reasonable precautionary measures."122 The occurrence of similar activities 
sufficient to constitute a foreseeable event may require more than the 
occasional crime. 123 However, a general pattern of dangerous student 
activity in those instances when the university has control 124 is at least 
sufficient to go to a jury to determine foreseeability, 125 if it is not a question 
of law determined by the court. 126 
Because of the wide variety of ways that students might be harmed by 
third parties on campus, colleges and universities cannot possibly plan for 
all eventualities. Many campuses are becoming increasingly conscious 
about security and safety measures and have created safety awareness 
App. Div. 2007) (finding that it was not foreseeable that a student would be harmed by 
a single punch during an altercation before class). 
119. Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 521-22 (Del. 1991) (holding that the 
university policy regulating fraternity hazing was evidence that the student VICtim's 
injuries incurred from a hazing incident were foreseeable to the umversity). 
120. A male student already accused of rape was placed in a coed dorm where he 
sexually assaulted his second victim. The university was aware of the previous 
allegation and had taken measures to prevent his contact with other coeds until the 
summer session when he was placed in the coed dorm Nero v. Kan State Umv., 861 
P.2d 768, 780 (Kan. 1993). 
121. Peterson, 685 P.2d at 120 1-{)2 (finding an assault foreseeable in location of 
other assaults); Furek, 594 A.2d at 521 (addressing similar hazing activities); Williams 
v. State, 786 So.2d 927, 932 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that recent cnme and 
violence on campus raised issue of fact as to foreseeability of four men assaulting and 
robbing a student in his dormitory room at gunpoint); Sharkey v. Bd. of Regents, 615 
N.W.2d 889, 901 (Neb. 2000) (finding that other violent altercations at that campus 
locations were not unknown). 
122. Sharkey, 615 N.W.2d at 901. 
123. One rape occurring on campus during a four- or five-year pcnod and m a 
different location was not enough to make the incident in question foreseeable in 
Kleisch v. Cleveland State University. No OSAP-289, 2006 WL 701047, at •6 (Oh10 
Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006). 
124. E.g., Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi, 987 P.2d 300, 312 (Idaho 1999) (denying the 
university's motion for summary judgment where university employees supervised 
student parties). 
125. Nieswand v. Cornell Univ., 692 F. Supp. 1464, 1468 (N D.N.Y. 1988); Furek, 
594 A.2d at 521-22; Johnson v. State, 894 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Wash. Ct. App. 1955). 
126. Knoll v. Bd. of Regents, 601 N.W.2d 757,764-75 (Neb. 1999). 
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programs. 127 Yet if some data are to be believed, personal crimes are on 
the rise on college and university campuses. In this age of consumerism, 
students are less loathe to hold colleges and universities accountable for 
harm incurred on their business premises. Colleges and universities have, 
after all, been marketing themselves in competition with each other for the 
past two or three decades. It is therefore incumbent on the colleges and 
universities to understand the legal challenges they face as business owners 
when they put together a task force to address the campus violence issues 
that may be looming on their horizons. 128 
TV. HIC LOCUS EST UBI MORS GAUDET SUCCURRER£ VITAE129 
The best diagnostic tools that a lawyer can provide to a task force are 
reports from or about other higher education institutions, auditing their 
efforts to prevent campus violence and to improve their preparedness in the 
eventuality preventive measures do not work. Public schools and state and 
federal agencies engaged in these activities after the Columbine High 
School tragedy in 1999.130 Eight years later, the murders at Virginia Tech 
finally prompted higher education and state and federal agencies to 
examine their own preparedness. The numerous reports generated will help 
other states and individual institutions learn from the past. In addition, they 
are templates for individual institutions to pattern the work of their own 
task forces, or work groups. For the individual user, these reports serve to 
127. The very limited literature reveals an increase in campus safety procedures in 
crime reporting, access to rape counseling, and mcreased campus lighting as well as 
increased security measures. These measures include increased patrols by foot or 
bicycle, nighttime escort, van and shuttle services; limited access to both residence 
halls and campus buildings; emergency phone systems; and program presentations to 
campus groups. LAURIE LEWIS, ELlZAilETH FARRIS, & BERNIE GREE\E, CA.\fPL:S CRIME 
AND SECURITY AT POSTSECO!IiDARY EDUCATIO!Ii hST1TUTIONS 31-37 (1997), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/97402.pdf; Bonnie S. Fisher, Crime and Fear on Campus, 539 
AlliMLS A\1. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 85, 98 -99 ( 1995). In addition, campus law 
enforcement has become more professionalized. See generally Kenneth J. Peak, 
Emmanuel P. Barthe, & Adam Garcia, Campus Policing in America.· A Twenty-Year 
Perspective, 11 POLICE Q. 239 (2008). In another study, a significant number of 
campus law-enforcement personnel indicated that procedures and policies have 
improved since the passage of the Clery Act, which requires reporting of campus crime 
statistics. Dennis E. Gregory & Steven M. Janosik, The C/ery Act: 1/ow Effective Is It? 
Perceptions from the Field The Current State of the Research and Recommendations 
for Improvement, 32 STETSON L. REV. 7, 45 (2002). 
128. See generally Joel Epstein, Breaking the Code of Silence: Bystanders to 
Campus Violence and the Law of College and University Safety, 32 STETSON L. REV. 
91' 120-22 (2002). 
129. "This is the place where Death rejoices to teach those who live." This 
declaration is often posted in morgues. See Ed Friedlander, Autopsy, 
http://www.pathguy.com/autopsy.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
130. E.g., COLUMBI!'-.E REPORT, supra note II ; O'TOOLE, supra note 11, at 6 (report 
initiated tn 1998); SECRET SERVICE Gt:IDE, supra note II . 
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highlight, f:trst of all, the shortcomings of institutional preparedness. 
Second, they help the individual institutions formulate their own checklists 
of issues without having to create them from scratch. And last, the 
individual institution can harvest ideas from the best that others have to 
offer on the same issues for adaptation to their own unique institution. If 
nothing else, these reports are cautionary tales, especially the heart-rending 
report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel, from which the individual 
institution can judge its own preparedness for campus violence and its 
aftermath. 
On April 16, 2007, a mentally ill student at Virginia Tech, in 
Blacksburg, Virginia, armed himself with guns and massacred thirty-two 
students and faculty members before turning one of the guns on himself. 131 
The shooter, Seung Hui Cho, was always a withdrawn child who, at one 
point, was diagnosed with "selective mutism."132 By the eighth grade, his 
writings exhibited early signs of suicidal and homicidal tendencies. 133 
After being on anti-depressants for a year, Cho was given an Individual 
Educational Plan (lEP) and counseling through high school, but upon 
matriculating at Virginia Tech, he sought out no counseling.134 In spring of 
his sophomore year, he exhibited signs of depression but still sought no 
therapy. 
By his junior year at Virginia Tech in 2005-2006, professors and fellow 
students took note of serious problems: he stabbed a student's carpet with a 
knife; he was removed from a poetry class because of the violence in his 
writing and his photographing classmates from under his desk; and a 
couple of female students reported his "annoying" repeated contacts. 135 
Observers variously notified the Division of Student Affairs, the counseling 
center, the health center, the Virginia Tech Police Department, the 
University's Care Team, and the Office of Judicial Affairs. 136 Throughout 
that winter, Cho was repeatedly interviewed by the campus counseling 
center and eventually put into a psychiatric hospital for overnight 
evaluation after he sent a suicidal instant message. However, by Spring 
2006, the counseling center was not treating him, and the University Care 
Team failed to follow up.137 In Fall 2006, two of his professors alerted the 
associate dean of students about Cho's mental problems: his behavior was 
increasingly angry, and he had submitted a creative writing assignment 
131 . E. A. Tomero, Jodt S. Cohen. & Rex W. Huppke, Bloodied Campus Asks: 
Where Were the Warnmgs? At Least 33 Die tn Virginia Tech Massacre, CHI. TRIB .. 
Apr. 17,2007, § I, at I. 
132. VIRGn-.1A TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. 
133. Jd. 
134. /d. at 22. 
135. ld. at 22 23. 
136. !d. 
137. !d. at 23. 
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about a young man who hates the students at his school, kills them, then 
commits suicide.138 
From February through April 15, 2007, Cho anned himself. Ensuing 
investigations reveal that he went to a tiring range to practice and may have 
rehearsed his plan by chaining the doors of Norris Hall, a classroom 
building on campus and the eventual site of the majority of murders.139 
The following is a summary of events taken from the Governor's 
Report140: 
Between 7:00a.m. and 7:15a.m. on April 16,2007, Cho shot and killed 
a female student and resident assistant at West Ambler Johnston residence 
hall. 141 By 7: 17 a.m., Cho returned to his own residence hall to change out 
of his bloody clothes. 142 Virginia Tech P.D. received a report of an injured 
female student, and by 7:24 a.m., an officer found the bodies at West 
Ambler. 143 About a half hour later, Blacksburg Police Department was 
called in to investigate. First classes of the day began at 8:00 a.m. as 
usual. 144 
The Chief of the Virginia Tech P.D. notified the University Policy 
Group and advised that a possible suspect to the West Ambler murders had 
left campus.145 By that time- 8:25 a.m.-the University Policy Group was 
deciding how to notify the campus.146 Shortly thereafter, at 8:52 a.m., the 
Blacksburg public schools were in lock-down.147 In the meantime, the 
Virginia Tech and Blacksburg P.D.s were tracking down the boyfriend of 
the slain female student as a suspect. 148 Second period classes at the 
University convened at 9:05 a.m. 149 
Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., Cho chained the doors of Norris Hall 
while the Policy Group sent out a campus-wide email notifying of the 
dormitory shootings.150 At 9:40 a.m., Cho began his shooting rampage in 
five classrooms in Norris Hall. 151 By 9:42 a.m., both Blacksburg P.D. and 
Virginia Tech P.D. had received calls about the Norris Hall shootings.152 
138. ld. at 23 24. 
139. Id. at 24. 
140. ld. at 25-29. 
141. Id. at 25. 
142. !d. 
143. !d. 
144. !d. 
145. Jd. 
146. Id. at 26. 
147. !d. 
148. !d. 
149. !d. 
150. !d. 
151. ld. at 27. 
152. !d. 
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Police arrived at Norris by 9:50 a.m., at which time the University-via 
email and loudspeaker-notified the campus of the shootings and warned 
students and faculty to stay in their buildings.153 The rampage ended when 
Cho killed himself at 9:51 a.m.154 At 10:17 a.m., the Umversity sent a third 
email that cancelled third-period classes and a fourth at 10:52 a.m. that 
advised that one shooter had been arrested and a second shooter was still on 
the loose. 155 Cho had killed two at the residence hall, thirty at Norris Hall, 
and himselfbefore it was all over. 156 
The most comprehensive of the reports authorized after these events was 
the August 2007 Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, submitted to Governor 
Timothy M. Kaine of the Commonwealth of Virginia.157 This 260-page 
report specifically focused on the events at Virginia Tech. Other reports 
focused less on Virginia Tech and more on comprehensive-albeit 
somewhat more general-studies of the problems with campus safety, such 
as the report issued by the National Association of Attorneys General, Task 
Force on School and Campus Safety: Report and Recommendations.158 In 
addition, several states initiated task forces to examine the problems of 
their own campuses' safety in direct response to the events at Virginia 
Tech. 159 The Virginia Tech Report is unique in its dissection of the events 
153. Jd. at 28. 
154. /d. 
155. Jd. 
156. Id. at 29. 
157. VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note l. 
158. NAT'L ASS'"' OF ATT'YS GEN., TASK FORCE 0"1 SCHOOL AND CAMPUS SAFETY: 
REPORT AND REC0\1ME"'DATIO'\S (2007), available at http://www.naag.org/ 
assets/fi les/pdf7NAA G_ Task_F orce_ on_School_and_ Campus_ Safety. pdf [hereinafter 
NAAG REPORT); see also DEP'TS OF HEALTH & HUMAI\ SERVICES, EDt,;C., AND 
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 0"1 ISSUES RAISED BY THE VIROI'-."lA TECH 
TRAGEDY (2007), available at http://www.hhs.gov/vtreport.html [hereinafter REPORT 
TO THE PRES!DE:\'T); IACLEA BLUEPRI"'T, supra note 67; VA. TECH SECURITY 
INFRASTRUCTURE WORKI>.;G GROUP, SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE WORKII\0 GROUP 
REPORT: PRESIDENTIAL WORKING PAPER (2007), available at 
http://www.vtnews.vt.edu/documents/2007-08-22_secunty_infrastructure.pdf 
(hereinafter VIRGINIA TECII lNFRASTRUCTLRE REPORT]. 
159. See, e.g., ILLI'\OIS REPORT, supra note 63. The Commonwealth of Kentucky 
initiated its task force on campus safety in 2006 but did not fintsh its report until after 
the events at Virginia Tech. GOVER>.;OR'S TASK fORCE ON CA\1PUS SAFETY, REPORT 
TO THE GOVER'-;OR: EXAMINATION OF SAFETY Al'iD SECt:RITY AT Kl::' TLCK Y'S PUBLIC 
Aii\D PRIVATE POSTSECO>.;DARY INSTITUTIONS: FINDI"lGS Ai''D RECOMMI:::\DATIONS 
(2007), available at http://dpp.ky.gov/NR!rdonlyre~34C366A3-6A6C-4131-A5DA-
42F462A 48377/0/GovemorTaskforceReport.pdf [hereinafter KE,TLCKY REPORT]; see 
also GUBER:\ATORIAL TASK FORCE FOR UNIV. CAMPUS SAFETY, REPORT 0' F!NDNGS 
AND RECOM\1E\lDATIO~S (2007), available at http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/ 
campussecunty/docs/finaiReport052407.pdf [hereinafter FLORIDA REPORT]; \to. 
CA\1PLS SECURITY TASK FORCE, SECLRI'G OUR Ft;TURE: MAKING COLI EGES A.\lD 
U:\IVERSITIES SAFE PLACES TO LEAR. AND GROW: REPORT ON fl"lDINGS A.'ID 
R.ECOMME:\DATIO-.;s (2007), available at http://dps.mo.gov/CampusSafety/ 
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of April 16,2007, but it informed not only Virginia's analysis of its campus 
violence problem but also the analyses of most of the other task forces 
throughout the nation. 
Key fmdings of Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech covered all facets of 
the tragedy, including Cho's mental health history, 160 the legality of Cho's 
gun purchases, 161 and emergency medical care on-site and at the 
surrounding medical facilities. 162 There arc also recommendations for 
legislative action. However, the aspects of the Virginia Tech Report that 
are most relevant to the participating lawyer are the legal issues identified 
in the chronology of events- both the good things and the bad things-and 
the individual institution's need to take ownership of its duty to students in 
the matter of campus violence and to find ways of fulfilling that duty. 
Books could be written-and probably will be--of other palliative 
measures to which campuses must be attentive. But sometimes simple is 
better-and enough. 
The Virginia Tech Report focused on several simple problems that 
engage the legal analysis that must be communicated to other members of 
an institutional task force. One of the major problems was that Cho was a 
walking time-bomb with problems apparent to the institution; yet he 
remained on campus. Thus, the Report criticized the lack of information 
sharing that led to ineffective or, at the end, to no intervention in Cho's 
mental health problems. Although privacy laws were criticized for the 
failure to coordinate information, the Report noted that university 
administrators misunderstood those privacy laws: they were not the 
hindrance as supposed. 163 Second, those who did know of the problem-
the University's counseling center and Care Team-failed to provide Cho 
with the mental health services and other interventions that might have 
GovemorsFina1Report.pdf [hereinafter MISSOURI REPORT]; N.J. CAMPuS SECt;RITY 
TASK FORCE REPORT SUBMITTED TO GOVER,OR Jo:-. S. CORZP\E (2007), available at 
http://www. nj home1andsccurity .gov/pdfs/ I 0-02-07 -campus-security. pdf [hereinafter 
NEW JERSEY REPORT]; 0K.LAH0\1A REPORT, supra note 40; STAll: OF N.M., 
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CAMPUS SAFFTY E\1ERGENCY MA'IAGf'ME:-.1'1/PuBLIC 
SAFCTY SUBC0\1MITTI::t::, RECOMMENDATIO'S !-'OR ACTION: E'v1ERGENCY PREI'ARED!IofSS 
l'l HIGHER EDUCATION (2007), available at http://www.nmsupolice.com/ 
Emergcncy%20Management/Final%20Subcommittee%20Rccommendations.pdf 
(hereinafter NEW MEXICO REPORT]; TASK FORCE 0"1 OHIO COil I::Gt:: CAMPLS SAI'ETY 
AND SECURITY, REPORT TO GOVERNOR TED STRICKI.ANO (2007), avui/ab/C' aL 
http ://regents.ohio.gov/safetyandsccuri ty/CSTF-F ina1_Report. pdf [he rcinaftcr 01110 
REPORT]; WISCONSIN REPORT, supra note 5. 
160. VIRGil\ lA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 31-52. 
161. !d. at 71-76. 
162. Id. at 101- 22. 
163. There are, however, a couple of incompatibi1ittcs between "cducatton records" 
protected under the Buckley Amendment, 20 U.S C. § 1232g (2006), and "health 
information" protected under HIPAA. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 2. 
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alleviated his problems or at least have provided him the help he nceded. 164 
Another major problem was the University's inefficient emergency plan. 
Although the police entities quickly responded to the calJs they received 
about the shootings at both West Ambler and Norris HalJ, Virginia Tech 
P.O. failed to request that the University issue an all-campus notification 
immediately after the West Ambler murders, and the University emergency 
plan did not alJow campus police to do so. Instead "[t]he police had to 
await the deliberations of the Policy Group, of which they are not a 
member, even when minutes count. The Policy Group had to be convened 
to decide whether to send a message to the university community and to 
structure its content."165 Two hours elapsed after the residence hall 
murders, during which Cho returned to Norris Hall. That failure to notify, 
coupled with the University's failure to cancel classes, provided no 
warning to either students or faculty of imminent danger on campus. 166 
Little analysis of higher education duties to their students is necessary to 
perceive the potential legal liability of that situation. 
The Virginia Tech Report formulated numerous recommendations for 
improving safety against campus violence seized upon by ensuing reports. 
One recommendation was the establishment of procedures for removing 
any dangerous student from campus, not just those with mental health 
issues such as Cho presented. 167 The Report drafters also recommended 
that colJeges and universities revisit their current student codes of conduct 
and student disciplinary proceedings inasmuch as Virginia Tech's Office of 
Judicial Affairs had proved ineffective. 168 Next, colleges and universities 
must document and provide for emergency proceedings when a student 
evinces dangerous, threatening or aberrant behavior.169 The college or 
university should also form a threat assessment team to establish the 
appropriate level of security for the campus, to deal with investigation, 
information-gathering, and case preparation for hearings, and to issue 
wamings. 170 The threat assessment team would coordinate and thereby 
improve information sharing about dangerous students. 171 Last, the Report 
emphasized emergency preparedness protocols to deal with the dangerous 
student who presents himself without prior warning, 172 especially the 
164. !d. And there was only one ineffectual effort to remove him from the campus 
environment. An involuntary commitment proceeding resulted in a ruling that 
outpatient treatment would be satisfactory, rather than commitment to a mental health 
facility. !d. at 56. 
165. /d. at 17. 
166. /d. at 3. 
167. /d. at 53 54. 
168. Jd. at 53. 
169. Jd. 
170. /d.at19. 
171. ld. at 53 54. 
172. The Clery Act requires public warnings be given about imminent danger on 
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implementation of a redundant campus-alerting system. 173 These 
recommendations of the Report were adopted by nearly all the state reports. 
However, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) 
Report is of especial interest because, of all the post-Yirgirua Tech reports, 
it is nearly the lone voice suggesting that higher education institutions need 
to make some general shifts in campus culture. The NAAG Report 
particularly stressed that the creation of threat assessment teams is 
necessary to be more attentive to the campus population itself as a source 
of campus violence: "[m]ost of the perpetrators have been 'malevolent 
insiders,' students or school personnel known by the school or other 
students."174 In order better to assess the threats posed by such insiders, 
these threat assessment teams must have multiple sources of information, 175 
including the creation of a reporting system that maintains the anonymity 
of students who might otherwise fear to rcport. 176 In a backhanded slap at 
higher education, the Attorneys General also noted that, by summer 2007, 
the majority of states required their public school districts to have 
emergency preparedness plans, 177 and that similar emergency preparedness 
plans are crucial to security on college and university campuses, with 
particular emphasis on upgrading, updating, and regularly testing 
emergency communications systems. 178 
With the templates of these various reports, the participating lawyer can 
assist the organization in the tasks that an individual institution's campus 
violence work group should tackle. Obviously, those institutions-
especially public colleges and universities-in states with their own post-
Virginia Tech reports should heed the guidance of those reports and their 
recommendations. However, additional assistance is available from other 
reports in niches that their own state did not othenvise cover, especially 
where state reports have a shallow treatment of campus violence. 
Whatever guidance is gleaned from these reports, the ultimate goal is to be 
campuses. /d. at 19. 
173. /d. at 18. 
174. NAAG REPORT, supra note 158, at 2. 
175. /d. at 3-4. 
176. ld at 6. 
177 The National Association of Attorneys General reported that thirty-eight states 
have such requirements. id. at 6, whereas the GAO report upon wh1ch they relied 
accounts for only thirty-two. U.S. GOV'T ACCOlJ~IABILITY OFF., EMERGESCY 
M.ANAGfMfi'\T: MOST SCHOOl DISTRICTS HA VI: DrVI:.LOI'ED EMERGP\CY 
\1ANAGEMI:.I\ T PLA.."<S, BUT WOLLD BENEfiT rR0\1 ADDIIIONAL FEDERAl GUIDA~CE 
II, 57 58 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.iterns/d07609.pdf [hereinafter 
GAO EMERGE1\CY MANAGEMENT RrPORT]. 
178. NAAG REPORT. supra note 158, at 7 8, 9 1 0; see also OHIO REPORT, supra 
note 159, at 134-36; see also UNIV. OF CAL .. THE REPOR1 OF THE UNIV.CRSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA CA\1PUS SECuRITY TASK FORCE 8-10 (2008), available at 
http://www.universityofcalifomia.edu/regcntslrcgmeet mar08/e2attach.pdf [hereinafter 
CALIFORNIA RI:.PORT]. 
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able to perform an audit of the institution's current practices and to 
recommend curative measures to assure the implementation of the best-
suited campus violence program. 
V. THE DISSECTIO~ & THE BODY ELEC..IRIC179 
Good preventive lawyering suggests that a campus violence task force 
must perform an audit of its institution's current practices, just as any other 
good business might do. 180 These audits have a legal aspect to them as they 
focus on the management of legal matters and risks in the corporate entity. 
In corporations, the legal audit may focus only on the health of the 
company wherein the focus of the examination is its fmancial statements, 
each fmancial item having a legal status. 181 But nowadays, companies 
engaging in preventive Ia\\ also conduct a litigation audit of unavoidable 
lawsuits; a procedural audit that focuses on the company's business 
documents; and compliance audits that focus on government statutes and 
regulations. 182 Similar procedures are appropriate for colleges and 
universities. Indeed, the numerous reports undertaken by the several state 
governments were, in many respects, just such audits of the state of health 
of their colleges and universities' campus safety and were done for 
purposes of risk management. 
Like a medical checkup, 183 a law audit has a diagnostic function, trying 
to find hot-spots of legal problems that have arisen or will arise on a 
regular basis. But it also requires an assessment of compliance with new 
cases, statutes and regulations. In the context of campus safety and 
security, the audit should review the institution's policies and practices to 
determine whether they pose potential legal problems. 184 This part of the 
audit should then prompt a discussion whether changes need to be made 
and a collaborative dtalogue to discuss "strategies, long- and short-term, for 
addressing those problems in ways that advance, or at least do not impede, 
the [institution's] educational priorities. " 185 
Law audits should be conducted periodically, not just on an as-needed 
basis. For instance, a periodic audit of Virginia Tech's campus security 
policies would have revealed that the University had the wrong contact 
information for the current Blacksburg chief of police, that its safety 
179. WAl.T WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS 77-84 (Modem Library n.d.) (1855). 
180. ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, PREVENTIVE LA\\: MAfERI.\LS ON A NON 
ADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS 180-99 ( 1997). 
181 . Louis M. Brown, Legal Audit, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 43 I, 436 ( 1965). 
182. Michael L. Goldblatt, Legal Audits Can Help Companies Act Preventively, in 
HARDAWAY, supra note 180, 194-97. 
183. Stolle, Wexler, Winick, & Dauer, supra note 13, at 17; HARDAWAY, supra 
note 180, at 189 91. 
184. Heubert, supra note 2, at 548. 
185. /d. 
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protocols had no provision for dealing with shooting incidents, and that its 
emergency preparedness plan was about two years old. 186 
On the other hand, the as-needed audit presupposes a legal problem 
already exists, often too late for the institution to take preventive measures. 
Furthermore, postponing an audit until needed relics on the confidence that 
the client recognizes the legal problem in the first place, a confidence that 
may well be misplaced at many institutions. Under the circumstances, a 
post-Virginia Tech campus security audit is an as-needed audit but one that 
the institution must periodically update. Ensuing periodic audits could be 
efficiently accomplished with a checklist for up-dating and fine-tuning 
campus safety and security procedures with or without formal intervention 
of a work group. 187 
Any audit for campus security and campus violence poses numerous 
tasks for a work group to tackle. Each individual institution must make its 
own decisions on the scope of the work group's brief as well as the 
budgetary impact on the institution for implementing any 
recommendations. In addition, the institution may decide to focus 
specialized attention on the professionalization of campus Jaw 
enforcemcnt188 and mental health treatment for mentally disturbed 
students. 189 Regardless of the recommendations eventually adopted, the 
audit is the first step in determining the institution's strengths and 
shortcomings in handling campus violence and, from there, implementing 
risk management mechanisms for "monitoring, accounting, sorting, 
channeling."190 The primary topics targeted by the post-Virginia Tech 
reports or suggested by their findings are audits of and changes to college 
and university policies regarding: 1) student discipline; 2) campus 
information sharing; 3) threat assessment teams; 4) student mental health; 
5) emergency preparedness protocols; and 6) campus police. 191 
186. VIRGil\ lA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-19. 
187. HARDAWAY, supra note 180, at 191. It should be a "client checklist which is 
sufficiently inviting to clients, so that chents will complete it within limited time and 
limited necessity to search out facts. It becomes the first step in the fact fmding and 
organizing process." !d. 
188. E.g., Jerry D. Stewart & John H. Schuh, Exemplar Programs and Procedures: 
Best Practices in Public Safety, in CREATlf\G A!\D MAINTAI?\ING SAFE COLLEGE 
CA.vtPLSES, supra note 64, at 223. 
189. E.g., Jeanette DiScala, Steven G. Olswang, & Carol S. Niccolls, College and 
Uni~·ersity Responses to the Emotionally or Mentally Impaired Student, 19 J.C. & U.L. 
17 (1992). 
190. Simon, supra note 41, at 33. 
191. In both the as-needed audit as well as the periodic audit dealing with these 
areas of concern, the participatory lawyer must be attentive not just to the case law that 
creates the risks around which the campus wants to manage its campus violence 
problems but also the affinnati\'e burdens imposed by both state and federal statutes 
and regulations. In particular, the lawyer will have to become fam1liar with, and 
continually update, state and federal statutes dealing with privacy, the Clery Act, 
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A. Student Discipline 
Regardle~s of whether the data show increasing or slightly decreasing 
campus violence, the fact remains that there appears to be institutional 
inattention, if not blindness, to the source of the vast majority of campus 
crime perpetrators-the students. One study suggests that 80% of the 
perpetrators arc fellow students. 192 Indeed, institutional residence halls are 
apparently more violent than institutions and even students are willing to 
admit. 193 Unfortunately for the goal of prevention, most violent campus 
crimes are impulsive rather than premeditated. However, there is a direct 
correlation between crime on campus-especially violent crimes and 
drug and alcohol use. 194 Consequently, any law audit worth its salt should 
address the institution's current code of student conduct and its disciplinary 
proceedings if it hopes to have any role in lowering the occasions of 
violence on campus, not just the mass shootings that have recently rocked 
higher education. 
I . Student Code of Conduct 
The Virginia Tech Report, because of the hole through which Cho 
escaped punishment for on-campus misconduct, was most explicit about 
the need to audit college and university codes of conduct and enforcement 
proceedings: 
Institutions of higher learning should review and revise their 
current policies related t«J-
a) recognizing and assisting students in distress 
b) the student code of conduct, including enforcement 
c) judiciary proceedings for students, including enforcement 
d) university authority to appropriately intervene when it is 
believed a distressed student poses a danger to himself or 
others195 
weapons possession, and due process. The Illmois Report issued in April 2008 
provtdes an Appendix C that has a checklist of legal issues that colleges and 
umversittes could use m improving campus safety. ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 63, at 
226. 
192. Fisher, Sloan, Cullen, & Lu, supra note 65, at 677; Stege! & Raymond, supra 
note 65, at 20. 
193. Fisher, Sloan, Cullen, & Lu, supra note 65, at 6 77. 
194. Siegel & Raymond, supra note 65, at 21 22. There also seems to be a dtrect 
correlation between drug or alcohol use and students who are crime ~"ictinl.~. !d. 
195. VIRGI'IA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 53. Only a couple of other reports 
deemed removing violent students from campus a priority. For example, in Kentucky. 
one pnonty is "[d]tsciplining (consistent wtth university policies) repeat offenders and 
those who engage in unacceptable behavior associated with substances.'' K.l:NTLCKY 
RFPORT, supra note 159. at 16. In Illinois, a goal is "[t]he inclusion of violence and 
threat of violence in the student code of conduct as behavior that may result in 
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Although the majority of reports address the need to better serve or, in 
the alternative, remove the student with mental health issues, institutions 
must address the discipline and removal of dangerous students in general, 
not just those who are in mental distress. Even without the reminder of 
Virginia Tech, conducting a periodic audit of a code of student conduct is 
necessary because of the evolution of student "insubordination" as well as 
the changes in governing statutes and regulations. 
The process of drafting or re-drafting a student conduct 
code allows members of the academic community to 
evaluate what choices they believe are educationally 
appropriate-away from the heat of a specific incident. It 
may also provide a bulwark against charges of arbitrary 
action; for example, allegations that the school singled out 
one student for particularly unfair treatment or applied 
processes or sanctions that were inconsistent from case to 
case.196 
Gone the way of the dodo should be a code of student conduct that 
merely exhorts students to conduct themselves in a manner befitting the 
institution. ln the fust place, such exhortation is simply too vague to 
comply with due process notice requircments. 197 Second, it tells the 
consumer nothing about the kind of behavior that might constitute a 
violation. And third, it gives a disciplinary body, especially one run by 
students without an institutional memory, the wherewithal to mete out 
incomplete, incoherent, and uneven justice under the school's disciplinary 
system.198 Violent students as well as the student disciplinary board need 
to be given parameters to follow, and merely appending the qualifier that 
students must comply with state and federal laws is not specific enough. 
Even in the absence of in loco parentis governance over student lives, 
the college or university remains an institution that must be specific about 
the rules of conduct. At the very least, a code of conduct is part of the 
educational mission of the institution.199 At the most, it is a set of 
workplace rules that assure the safety of its consumers (although the 
suspension, dismissal, or expulsion and how a violation of that standard may impact 
enrollment and/or housing status and appeal rights." ILLI'OIS REPORT, supra note 63, 
at 226. "The student code of conduct should clearly define what behavior is 
unacceptable, and students should be held accountable if their conduct is a violation." 
W!SCO'\SN REPORT, supra note 5, at 62. 
196. Edward N. Stoner 1T & John Wesley Lowery, Navigating Past the "Spin·t of 
Insubordination ": A Twenty-First Century Model Student Conduct Code with a Model 
Hearing Script, 31 J.C. & U.L. l, 11 (2004). 
197. Soglin v. Kauffman. 418 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1969). 
198. Calling a school disciplinary procedure a "judicial" process is incorrect 
because courts have fairly consistently held that campus internal disciplinary 
proceedings are not judicial proceedings. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 15. 
199. !d. at 3-5. 
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consumers themselves may not view it that way). Ideally, it is a code of 
conduct instructing students to behave as members of the institution.200 
A college or university code of conduct need not be as specific as a 
criminal code; however, it must be sufficiently specific to comply with due 
process notice and what process is due.201 State colleges and universities 
are required to comply with the due process requirements of notice, 
reasonable explanation of charges, and opportunity for a fair hearing under 
the Fourteenth Amendrnent.202 Private higher education institutions are, on 
the other hand, governed by a more contractual agreement to afford 
"fundamental" or "basic" fairness to students in their disciplinary 
proceedings, or to at least agree not to act "arbitrarily and capriciously."203 
Although courts may be affording some deference to private institutions in 
the manner in which they conduct student disciplinary proceedings, there 
seems no principled nor institutional reason for not affording the same 
procedures required of public institutions.204 The efficiency of having the 
same process, familiar to most lawyers, would have little or no cost to the 
institution and even if it did, the benefit would certainly eliminate the 
litigation that ordinarily ensues. Thus, the starting point for reviewing any 
student code of conduct should be one that mirrors the requirements of a 
public college or university. 
In the spirit of not reinventing the wheel, a terrific resource for 
reviewing a student code of conduct is the model information set out in 
Navigating Past the "Spirit of Insubordination": A Twenty-First Century 
Model Student Conduct Code with a Model Hearing Script ("Model 
Student Conduct Code").205 That article sets out a very detailed analysis on 
building a code from scratch. But two specific areas are pertinent to a task 
force's audit of an existing student code: defining prohibited student 
200. Jd. at II . 
201. ld. at 15. 
202. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 581 (1975); Pugel v. Bd. ofTrs., 378 F.3d 
659, 663 64 (7th Cir. 2004); Joseph M. Landers, Academic Student Dismissals at 
Puhltc Institutions of Higher Education: When Is Academic Deference Not an Issue?, 
34 J.C. & U.L. 21, 28-39 (2007); Johanna Matloff, Note. The New Star Chamber: An 
Illusion of Due Process Standards at Pnvate University Disciplinary Hearings, 35 
SUfFOLK U. L. R EV. 169, 169 (2001). 
203. E.g., Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 34-35 (lst Cir. 2007) 
(holding that a contractual relationship between student and university includes duties 
of good faith and fa1r dealing); Jason J. Bach, Students Have Rights, Too: The Drafting 
of Student Conduct Codes, 2003 BYU Eouc. & L.J. I, 10-11 (2003); Matloff, supra 
note 202, at 174-75; Lisa Tcnerow•cz, Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges 
and Unil•ersities: A Roadmap for "Fundamental Fairness " in Disciplinary 
Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. REv. 653, 657-58 (200 I). 
204. E.g., Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline. A Guide to Fair 
Process for the University Student, 99 COU..i.\of. L. REV. 289, 291 ( 1999); Tenerowicz, 
supra note 203, at 675-82. 
205. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 1. 
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behavior (violations) and enforcement. 
Regarding prohibited student behavior, the Model Student Conduct Code 
sets out a framework for specific offenses under a list of rules and 
regulations. A plethora of offenses is listed, including academic 
dishonesty; violation of federal, state, or local law; and the like. Similarly 
comprehensive lists have been formulated and used by numerous higher 
education institutions.206 However, several offenses stand out as worthy of 
inclusion in a code of conduct to target both the violent and potentially 
violent student on campus. 
First, any violent activity that is a violation of state or federal law should 
be prohibited behavior under the student conduct code.207 A second group 
of prohibited acts should include "[p ]hysical abuse, verbal abuse, threats, 
intimidation, harassment, coercion, and/or other conduct [that] threatens or 
endangers the health or safety of any person."208 More specific events 
could be listed, but these generic categories of physical and mental 
violence give notice to most students of the types of behavior proscribed by 
the conduct code and thereby warranting discipline.209 Third, hazing 
prohibitions have the potential to prevent violent behavior, and in some 
instances reflect the requirements of state law. 210 
More amorphous standards designed to cut the incidence of campus 
violence-such as a student code's aspiration to act in a socially 
responsible manner, perhaps based on a religious credo-may act as a 
positive influence at private institutions. Unfortunately, they are too vague 
206. See, e.g., IND. UNIV., CODE OF STUDENT RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, A'-;D 
CONDL.CT (2005), available at http://dsa.indiana.edu/Code/Code%20of1l/o20Student%20 
Rights, %20Responsibilities, %20and%20Conduct%202005 .pdf [hereinafter 1 U CODE 
OF CONDUCT]; Purdue University, University Regulations 2008 2009, Part 5 -Student 
Conduct, http://www.purdue.edu/univrcgs/pages/stu_conduct/stu_conduct.html (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2009); UN I\ . OF NOTRE DAME, DULAC: A GUIDE TO STUDENT LIFE 
2008-2009 97-204 (2008), available at http://orlh.nd.edu/dulac/duLac%202007.pdf. 
207. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 29. 
208. Id. at 27. 
209. Colleges and universities will also have to decide how far to extend thetr 
student code of conduct, i.e., how much, if any, off-campus behavior should be 
considered a v10latton of college and university rules and regulations. !d. at 25-27. 
But see John Friedl, Punishing Students for Non-Academic Misconduct, 26 J.C. & U.L 
701 (2000). 
As many schools expand the scope of sanctions they apply to their students' 
non academic misconduct, critics protest that students fall victim to a 
growing wave of political correctness and a double standard that imposes a 
moral agenda by suspending or ignonng Constitutional safeguards that would 
otherwise be available in court proceedings if the students were charged with 
criminal rrusconduct. 
ld. at 702. 
210. Walter M. Kimbrough, Why Students Beat Each Other: A Development 
Perspective for a Detrimental Crime, in CRI:.ATil\G & MAP.-.IAINING SAFE COLLEGE 
CA~1PUSES, supra note 64, at 58, 71; Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 28. 
360 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW [Vol. 35, No. 2 
to withstand due process requirements at public institutions.211 ln fact, 
private institutions should combine this aspiration with a specific list of 
offenses if they really want to get through to their consumer students. 
Any student conduct code must be distributed to every student each year. 
Freshmen and transfer students should be specifically advised of the 
individual behavior that will get them in trouble. The code should also be 
distributed annually to faculty, staff, and even parents. Annual distribution 
serves as notice for due process purposes but also advises the individual 
student of the behavioral standard to which she must conform. Annual 
distribution is also an integral part of instilling a different cultural paradigm 
toward campus violence. Including the student conduct code in a 
voluminous student or faculty handbook is not realistically helpful. In the 
real world, nobody-faculty or students-reads those voluminous 
handbooks unless they are looking for something that affects their 
immediate lives, like the location of the nearest dining facility. Posting the 
code on the campus website is also of little practical value; anecdotal 
experience has proved how hard it is to locate the codes on some websites. 
Instead, the student conduct code should be a separate pamphlet distributed 
each year, which also includes the student disciplinary proccdure.212 In 
addition, the list of offenses should be posted in easily accessible places, 
such as residence halls and lobbies of classroom buildings. These 
proactive measures may be the only way to make a campus cultural shift 
away from the typical reactive attitude in which the awareness of campus 
violence arises and lasts only a couple of weeks after a violent event.213 
2. The Disciplinary Process 
The campus violence law audit should also re-examine the disciplinary 
procedures themselves to assure that they comport with due process: notice, 
explanation of the "charges," and an opportunity to be heard.214 This 
means that the student is entitled to have the "charges" against him reduced 
to writing, with an explanation "reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."215 The 
opportunity to be heard requires no particular form of hearing, but 
guidelines on the procedures should be written, both for consistency's sake 
and to avoid making ad hoc decisions on difficult mattcrs.216 
2 II. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 33 34 & nn. I 02- 03. 
212. See, e.g., TU CODE OF Cmmucr, supra note 206. 
213. Siegel & Raymond, supra note 65, at 23. 
214. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 38-54; Charles Alan Wright, The 
Constitution on the Campus, 22 V A.'\0. L. RFv. 1027, 1071-74 ( 1969). 
215. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Stoner 
& Lowery, supra note 196, at 40. 
216. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 44. 
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It is not enough, however, to have the procedure in writing; it must be 
known and understood. The procedure could be easily collated with the 
student conduct code for easy annual distribution. Faculty should be 
particularly singled out to refresh themselves about the procedures for their 
own edification and as a resource for student questions. In addition, each 
member of the campus disciplinary board should be trained (or retrained) at 
the beginning of each academic year so as to be familiar and fluent in the 
procedures. 
A campus violence work force might also fmd it useful to review the 
personnel who are involved in disciplinary proceedings besides students, 
faculty, and administrators. Lawyers and mental health professionals arc 
especially useful adjuncts to the process. The presence of a lawyer either 
on the panel or as an advisor to the proceedings assures the regularity of 
and consistency in the process. A mental health professional should also be 
in attendance, if not as a panel member then as an observer. That mental 
health professional would be better able than other members of the board to 
recognize students in mental distress, especially those who should be 
"diverted" from the disciplinary system into mental health counseling.217 
A final aspect of the disciplinary procedure that the audit must examine 
is the institutional attitude to sanctions meted out to violent students. 
Clearly, flexibility in the types of sanctions is usefu1,218 and a one-size-fits-
all formula for punishing violent students is unwise viz. the problems with 
zero-tolerance policies.219 However, the work group must attend to a major 
problem with discipline and campus culture: other students are loathe to 
shun students who commit violent acts.220 One reason for this is that 
campus violence often involves crimes of impulse and alcohol use. 
Otherwise, student perpetrators are not problems on campus.221 So other 
students do not view them as violent students and tend to be more forgiving 
of their transgressions. 
In light of a student culture of alcohol consumption and campus violence 
with little peer accountability, the work group may have to tie the penalty 
and enforcement of violent campus crimes to a comprehensive alcohol 
program.222 Creative ways to salvage the students while penalizing their 
217. The mental health professional could be a professor on the faculty or an 
outsider but probably should not be a member of the campus counseling center. The 
student involved may already be involved in counseling, and a member of the 
counseling center might be inclined to be the student's advocate rather than a 
disinterested professional charged with being neutral in the disciplinary process. 
218. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 54-57. 
219. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You 're Out! 
Constitutional Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 W ASH U. L.Q. 
65 (2003). 
220. Siegel & Raymond, supra note 65, at 25. 
221. !d. at 23. 
222. Sudakshina L. Ceglarek & Aaron Brower, Changing the Culture of High-Risk 
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violent behavior may entail requiring their participation in rehabilitation or 
similar diversionary program, such as anger management class. 
Furthermore, if the acceptance of drinking and campus violence is 
pervasive enough throughout a particular campus, violent offenders are not 
going to face punishment from a disciplinary board that includes student 
peers. Consequently, the work group might consider removing the 
enforcement function from the disciplinary board and resting it with an 
administrator. 223 
3. Summary Proceedings 
A necessary but perhaps overlooked part of the disciplinary process that 
an audit should examine is the summary proceeding, a foreshortened 
procedure by which a student may be immediately removed from campus, 
pending more formal procedures. That rijht is usually attributed to the 
Supreme Court decision in Goss v. Lopez: 24 "[s]tudents whose presence 
poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of 
disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from 
school."225 Although Goss dealt with the temporary suspension of public 
school students, colleges and universities typically have similar rights 
under the appropriate circumstances. 226 Such a summary proceeding 
usually entails a temporary suspension from the college or university until 
the full panoply of due process rights will be afforded to the student.227 
In following such a procedure, the college or university must still 
comport with a modicum of due process by offering oral or written notice 
of the charges against the student, an explanation of those charges, and an 
opportunity to rebut the charges with his own version of events.228 
However, the full formalities of due process may be reserved to a later time 
while the student has been removed from campus. These truncated 
procedures are typically vested in a school administrator, who makes the 
immediate decision to suspend the student for health and safety reasons 
pending investigation and a full hearing.229 This procedure is particularly 
Drinking, in CREATING AND MAINTAI!\ING SAFE COLLEGE CAMPUSES, supra note 64, at 
15, 17. 
223. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 58-59. 
224. 419 u.s. 565 (1975). 
225. /d. at 582. 
226. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 59; Wright, supra note 214, at 1074-75. 
227. E.g., Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 59~0. 
228. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581; Stoner & Lowery, supra note 196, at 59~0; see 
generally Julie Underwood, The 30th Anniversary ofGoss v. Lopez, 198 Eouc. L. REP. 
795 (2005) 
229. See, e.g., Morfit v. Univ. of S. Fla., 794 So.2d 655, 655 (Fla Ct. App. 200 I); 
Held v. State Univ. of N.Y., 630 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); Stoner & 
Lowery, supra note 196, at 59; DePauw University, Student Handbook: Interim 
Suspensions and No Contact Orders, http://www.depauw. 
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useful in removing students for a variety of behaviors that might pose a 
danger to the campus: criminal offenses that might endanger other 
students,230 assault,231 alcohol-related violations,232 drug offenses,233 
harassment,234 weapons on campus,235 and cumulative disciplinary 
violations of a threatening and destructive nature.236 
4. Weapons And Alcohol 
Two additional matters related to the student conduct code should be 
scrutinized by the work group because of their close relationship to campus 
violence-weapons and alcohol. As to the first, state law will play a part in 
any policy dealing with weapons on campus, particularly fireanns.237 
Despite the unsupported premise that an armed student could stop 
massacres like the one that occurred at Virginia Tech, campus officials and 
eduluniv/handbooks/dpuhandbooks.asp?ID=430&parentid=425 (last visited Feb. 28, 
2009); Purdue University, University Regulations 2008 2009, Part 5 -Student 
Conduct, http://www.purdue.edu/univregs/pages/ stu_conductlinv _ withdraw.html (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
230. Ali v. Stetson Univ., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (addressing a 
student arrested for off-campus weapons offense); Wallace v. Fla. A&M Uruv., 433 
So.2d 600 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983) (addressing a student with drug conviction for 
possession of cocaine on a neighboring campus). But see Held, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 199-
200 (holding the university improperly suspended student only charged but not yet 
convicted of various drug offenses because no evidence of harm to the campus). 
231. Ebert v. Yeshiva Univ., 780 N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (concerning 
student with prior disciplinary problems who struck two other students). 
232. Saliture v. Quinnipiac Unh., No. 3:05cv1956, 2006 WL 1668772, at *I (D. 
Conn. June 6, 2006) (addressing students arrested while hosting a keg party m an off-
campus residence). 
233. Flaim v. Med. Coli. of Ohio, No. 2004-04132, 2004 WL 2521293, at *I (Ohio 
Ct. Cl. Oct. 6, 2004) (addressing a medical student who pleaded guilty to felony drug 
offense). 
234. Nguyen v. Univ. ofLouisville, No. Civ.A. 3.04CV-457-H, 2006 WL 1005152, 
at *l (W.O. Ky., Apr. 14, 2006) (addressing a student accused of a series of harassing 
ematls and stalking). 
235. Dvoret v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coli., No. CIV. 03-2133 PHX V AM, 2006 
WL 1600132, at *l (D. Anz. June 5, 2006) (addressing a student entered campus with 
knife and baton three days after another disgruntled student had murdered three faculty 
members on a nearby campus); Centre Coli. v. Trzop, 127 S.W.3d 562 (Ky. 2003) 
(addressing a student who possessed five-mch knife on campus m derogation of 
campus regulations). 
236. Hill v. Bd. of Trs., 182 f. Supp. 2d 621 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (addressmg a 
student on probation for alcohol violations and interfering with people reporting rule 
infractions immediately suspended after participating in riot after university basketball 
team was defeated in Final Four). 
237. The Supreme Court's recent Second Amendment decision m Distnct of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), still seems to reserve to the states the right 
to prohibit firearms in sensitive locations such as schools. /d. at 2816-17. Whether the 
Court's use of the term "schools" embraces higher education institutions remains to be 
seen. 
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many students oppose the introduction of weapons on campus.238 
"Weapons challenge the traditional safety and security of college 
campuses. Families, students, staff, and visitors to campus have an 
expectation of safety and nonviolence."239 
Even more vehement in their determination to keep weapons off campus 
are campus police.240 This is particularly so when alcohol is introduced 
into the equation: "[a]nother troubling element of weapons possession is 
the apparent co-occurrence of weapons possession with binge drinking and 
drug use. The disinhibiting effect of the substances results in less influence 
by normal social controls."241 Gun ownership combined with alcohol 
consumption is especially vexing: "gun-owning college students are more 
likely than their unarmed counterparts to drink frequently and excessively 
and, when inebriated, to engage in activities that put themselves and others 
at risk for life-threatening injury, such as driving when under the influence 
of alcohol, vandalizing property, and having unprotected intercourse."242 
For the most part, however, weapons seem to play but a small part in 
campus violence;243 alcohol is the bigger problem. 
Alcohol abuse on campus is a prime source of campus violence.244 
Indeed, "[f]rom the perspectives of both victims and perpetrators, the more 
violent crimes were associated with more frequent drug and alcohol use."245 
The only approaches that seem to have any impact on alcohol abuse on 
campus are systemic, campus-wide cultural changes.246 Obviously, there 
238. E.g., VlRGlNIA TECH REPORT, supra note l, at 75; WISCONSIN REPORT, supra 
note 5, at 68--69. 
239. E.g., Charles Cychosz, The Incompatibility of Weapons and College 
Campuses, in CREATING AND MAI NTAINING SAFE COLLEGE CAMPUSES, supra note 64, 
at 188,202. 
240. IACLEA BLUEPRINT, supra note 67, at 7 ("(International Association of 
Campus Law Enforcement Administrators] does not support the carry and concealment 
of weapons on a college campus, with the exception of sworn police officers in the 
conduct of their professional duties."). 
241. Cychosz, supra note 239, at 194. An additional concern is that the presence of 
weapons on campus seems to increase the "lethality of suicidal behavior." !d. 
242. Matthew Miller, David Hemenway, & Hany Weschler, Guns and Gun Threats 
at College, 51 J. OF AM. COLL. HEAL Til 57,63 (2002) ("[T)wo[-)thirds of students with 
guns at college report binge drinking."). 
243. Siegel & Raymond, supra note 65, at 23. 
244. !d. at 21-22; Robert F. Marcus & Bruce Swett, Multiple-Precursor Scenarios: 
Predicting and Reducing Campus Violence, 18 J. OF lNTERPERSO, AL VIOLENCE 553, 
567--68 (2003); Siegel & Raymond, supra note 65, at 22 ("[O]ver 80% of the 130 
students [in this study], who had both committed and been the victim of multiple 
crimes since enrolling in college, reported using alcohol at the time that their most 
serious crime was committed."); KENTUCKY REPORT, supra note 159, at 13-17. 
245. Siegel & Raymond, supra note 65, at 22. 
246. E.g., Ceglarek & Brower, supra note 222, at 15; Simon, supra note 41, at 31 
36. This cultural change does not anticipate the college or university's undertaking any 
particular duties such as posting guards in dorms, imposing curfews, or engaging in 
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has to be provision for on-campus drinking in any student code of conduct: 
underage drinking is unlawful in all states, while in many states, drinking 
on state property is also unlawful. Furthermore, many private schools, 
especially those with religious affiliations, are philosophically opposed to 
drinking. 
High-risk, or binge, drinking has had an especially noxious effect on 
campus life, especially in the incidence of violence: "[B]inge drinking ... 
is a major public health challenge on college campuses that leads to a 
number of harmful consequences, including violence, noise complaints, 
vandalism, transports to detox caused by overconsumption, and sexual 
assaults, among others."247 Given that 25% of the student population has 
reported negative consequences from problem drinking,248 broader campus 
initiatives and partnerships will be required to ameliorate its impact on 
campus violence. Consequently, the campus violence work group may 
decide that attending to this matter warrants significant study and 
implementation to change the campus culture, and thereby remove at least 
one source of campus violence. 
B. Campus Information Sharing 
Information-sharing within the campus community was a major problem 
at Virginia Tech and the subject of much concern in most of the post-event 
reports.249 The biggest problem was that the university community with 
whom Cho had contact- "his professors, fellow students, campus pohce, 
the Office of Judicial Affairs, the Care Team, and the Cook Counseling 
Center"-did not coordinate their information about his deteriorating 
mental state and his increasingly unstable behavior.250 This lack of 
coordination and absence of information sharing have been blamed on the 
restrictions of privacy laws guarding both Cho' s education records and his 
mental health problems. Rather than the laws themselves, the more likely 
culprit was a campus-wide ignorance of how those laws work and of the 
donn checks. However, the laissez-faire attitude struck by courts in cases such as 
Tan;a H. v. The Regents of the University of California, 278 Cal. Rptr. 918, 920 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1991 ), can no longer be the expectation of the campus that does not address 
alcohol and substance abuse problems. 
247. Ceglarek & Brower, supra note 222, at 15. 
248. ld Further, "students were under the influence of alcohol or other drugs in 
13% of incidents of ethnic harassment, 46% of incidents of theft involvtng force or 
threat of force, 51% of threats of phystcal assault, 64°1o of phystcal assaults, 71 °'o of 
forced sexual touchtng, and 79% of unwanted sexual intercourse .. , CARR, supra note 
67, at 8. 
249. E.g., Darby Dickerson, Lessons in Co/laboration: Learning from the Post-
Virginia Tech Task Force Reports, CAMPUS ACTIVITIES REPORTING, Oct. 2007, at 20, 
available at http:l/ssm.com/abstract=l087815; VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 63-70; WISCO'-<SIN REPORT, supra note 5, at 61 64. 
250. VIRG[}llA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 63. 
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nearly universal exception allowing for disclosure of private information 
for an emergency such as existed at Virginia Tech. 
At least three types of privacy laws operate to protect the nonconsensual 
disclosure of private information about students. The first type, state 
privacy laws, are unique to each jurisdiction so a lawyer participating on a 
campus violence task force must educate herself about their prohibitions 
and exceptions, if any.251 These state laws may implicate both the privacy 
of a student's education and disciplinary records and the confidentiality of 
mental health records. State law also may be more restrictive than federal 
law.2S2 
The second type of privacy law concerns the confidentiality of mental 
health treatment records. Many believe that these records are governed by 
the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),253 
when a student-like Cho-is being treated for mental health issues by a 
university clinic. HIP AA regulates the electronic release of "protected 
health information" by health-care providers.254 HIP AA and its regulations 
pose labyrinthine challenges to understanding HIPAA's relationship to 
other laws, especially its relationship to disclosure of "education records" 
under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).255 
However, HIP AA does not really apply to campus counseling treatment 
records because it does not protect treatment records of postsecondary 
counseling centers that are maintained only for treatment purposes and are 
not otherwise disclosed. 256 In its stead, campus counseling centers and 
251. The college and university "contract" with students may also explicitly contam 
a waiver of certain privacy information when it allows the institution to contact a 
student's parents about disciplinary issues. See, e.g., Saliture v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 
3:05cvl956, 2006 WL 1668772, at •5 (D. Conn. June 6, 2006) ("Quinn•piac reserves 
the right to communicate with parents on any student disciplinary action taken by 
Quinnipiac officials."); Purdue University, supra note 206, at Part 5, Section 
111(C)(2)(b) ("A copy of the notice of charges may be sent to the parent or guardian of 
the student if the student is dependent as defined in Section 152 ofthe Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954."); see also Nancy Tribbensee, Privacy and Confidentiality: Balancing 
Student Rights and Campus Safety, 34 J.C. & U.L. 393, 409- 15 (2008) (discussing 
duties and restrictions for parental notification concerning students in distress). 
252. See, e.g., Susan P. Stuart, A Local Distinction: State Education Privacy Laws 
for Public Schoolchildren, I 08 W.VA. L. REv. 361 (2005). 
253. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-d-8 (2000); see also Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(1996). 
254. See, e.g., Susan P. Stuart, Lex-Praxis of Education Informational Privacy for 
Public Schoolchildren, 84 NEB. L. REv. 1158, 1182 (2006). 
255. Tribbensee, supra note 251, at 407--{)8. 
256. The extent of "protected health informatiOn" under HIPAA excludes 
"mdividually identifiable health information" contained in records on a student who is 
eighteen years of age or older, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education, 
which are made or maintained by a physician, psychiatnst, psychologist, or other 
recogruzed professional or paraprofessional acting m his professional or 
paraprofessional capacity, or assisting in that capacity, and which are made, 
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related mental health professionals generally are prohibited from revealing 
mental health treatment records under both ethical obligations and state and 
federal medical and disability laws.257 On the other hand, most laws will 
allow disclosure of counseling information if the student threatens to harm 
herself or others.258 Consequently, a campus violence task force would do 
a service to its faculty and staff by having the college or university's mental 
health professionals explain the restrictions of their confidentiality duties 
and the extent to which state law allows them to divulge dangerous activity 
that might threaten campus violence.259 
Ironically, the statute that bore the brunt of the blame for lack of campus 
information-sharing has the lowest threshold of disclosure: FERPA.260 
FERP A protects "education records" from nonconsensual disclosure at 
education institutions that receive federal funds. Education records are 
"those records, files, documents, and other materials which-(i) contain 
information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an 
educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or 
institution."261 Education records do not include those materials in the sole 
possession of the maker nor records of an institution's Jaw enforcement 
unit.262 Education records may be shared with other members of the 
educational institution if they have legitimate educational interests.263 
Specifically exempted nonconsensual disclosures include disciplinary 
records when they relate to a student's behavior264 and to reports of 
institutional, state, and federal violations of alcohol or controlled 
substances laws and regulations for students under twenty-one.265 
Regardless, health and safety matters have always trumped privacy 
under FERPA: nonconsensual disclosures may be made ''in connection 
with an emergency if the knowledge of the information is necessary to 
maintained, or used only in connection with the provision of treatment to the student, 
and are not available to anyone other than persons providing such treatment, except that 
such records can be personally reviewed by a physician or other appropnate 
professiOnal of the student's choice. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv) (2006); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 160.103 (2008). These records arc also excluded under FERP A. And HIP AA does 
not affect "education records" under FERPA. 45 C.F.R. § I 60. I 03. 
257. Tribbensee, supra note 251 , at 407-()8. 
258. !d. at 406-()7. 
259. !d. at 408-()9. 
260. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006); see generally Stuart, supra note 254, at 1162-73; 
Tribbensee, supra note 251, at 395 -405. 
261. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(D)(4)(A). These may mclude records at student health 
centers if they are maintained for more than JUSt treatment. See VIRGtr-.IA TECH 
REPORT, supra note I, at G-4. 
262. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i), (ii). 
263. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l). 
264. 20 u.s.c. § 1232g(h). 
265. 20 u.s.c. § 1232g(i). 
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protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals."266 This 
emergency regulation is to be strictly construed,267 but education 
institutions are given significant discretion in determining what is or is not 
an emergency that is not likely to be second-guessed unless a "reasonable 
college official" would not have released the information.268 This 
regulation has been interpreted to allow disclosures impelled by "concerns 
for a student's welfare such as a serious eating disorder, dangerous high-
risk behavior such as heavy or binge drinking, suicidal ideation or threats, 
or erratic and angry behaviors that others might reasonably perceive as 
threatening."269 Regardless, if the information is not in a "record," it can be 
disclosed. 
That is the irony of the confusion over FERPA's protections. Classroom 
observations and personal interactions with an individual are not private 
records under FERPA. The record in which that information might be 
reduced may not be disclosable, but any word-of-mouth disclosures arising 
from day-to-day contact with a student docs not fit within the purview of 
FERP A. FERP A protects the privacy of student records; it does not protect 
student privacy per se.270 One of the goals, then, of a campus violence 
work group is to better educate the campus community about the narrow 
scope of FERPA's prohibitions so as to effectuate better information 
266. 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(a) (2006); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)( I )(I). 
267. 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(c) (2006). The Department of Education recently proposed 
changes to this health and safety regulation: 
The Department proposes to revise § 99.36(c) to remove the 
language requiring strict construction of tills exception and add a 
provision that in making a determination under § 99.36(a), an 
educational agency or institution may take into account the totality 
of the circumstances pertaining to a threat to the safety or health of a 
student or other individuals. If the educational agency or institution 
detennincs that there is an aniculable and significant threat to the 
health or safety of a student or other individuals, it may disclose 
information from education records to any person whose knowledge 
of the information is necessary to protect the health and safety of the 
student or other individuals. If, based on the information available at 
the time of the determination, there is a rational basis for the 
detennination, the Department will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the educational agency or institution in evaluating the 
Circumstances and making its determination. 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. 15574-0 I, 15589 (proposed Mar. 
24, 2008) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 99). 
268. Brown v. City of Oneanta, 858 F. Supp. 340, 344 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). 
Regardless, students have no enforceable privacy rights w1der FERPA for wrongful 
disclosure. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doc, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002); see Susan P. Stuart, Fun 
with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer on Education Privacy as Constitutional 
Liberty, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 563, 639-40 (2004). 
269. Tribbensee, supra note 251, at 40 I (footnote omitted). 
270. Jd. at 396. 
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sharing about dangerous or endangered students.271 
The participating lawyer must also be attentive to two bills introduced 
shortly after the events at Virginia Tech and now winding their way 
through various congressional committees. Both are designated FERP A 
amendments. The Senate bill is the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act Amendments of 2008 and adds a subsection (k) to FERP A that enables 
campus health professionals to share treatment records with other medical 
professionals.272 The Senate bill would also expand the emergency 
disclosure exception under FERPA.273 The House bill is the Mental Health 
Security for America's Families in Education Act of2007.274 This Act also 
adds a new subsection (k), but allows educational institutions to disclose 
information that "the student poses a significant risk of harm to himself or 
herself, or to others, including a significant risk of suicide, homicide, or 
assault."275 Obviously, keeping abreast of these developments is crucial in 
formulating campus information-sharing policies. 
Procedures for the centralization of information-sharing are a 
fundamental task of a campus violence work group: "Incidents of aberrant, 
dangerous, or threatening behavior must be documented and reported 
immediately .... "276 Mandatory reporters should include professors and 
resident hall staff with specific guidelines for making those reports. 
Students should be repeatedly educated about the need to report violent 
behavior, anonymously if necessary to make them feel more comfortable. 
In fact, the failure to report and share information may incur liability for 
bystanders. 277 
As one state report suggested: 
Develop and support a comprehensive open reporting 
mechanism, "No secrets," within the university or college. This 
reporting mechanism must be supported by a data collection tool 
that: a) allows for real time submission and acceptance of 
incident information as submitted by all university employees 
and students and b) allows the investigator to rank the reported 
behavior by level of severity upon initiation of any investigation 
or intervention. There should be a mechanism in policy that 
271. "For pen;onal experiences, such disclosures may be made to appropriate 
pen>ons with the expertise to prov1de counsel on the issues of concern w1thout 
implicating FERPA." Id 
272. S. 2859, !lOth Cong. § 2 (2008). 
273. S. 2859. 
274. H.R. 2220, II Oth Cong. (2007): see also John S. Gearan, Note, When Is it OK 
to Tattle? The Need to Amend the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 39 
SUffOlK U. L. REV. 1023 (2006). 
275. H.R. 2220, § 3. 
276. VlRGI'liA TECH REPORT, supra note I , at 53. 
277. See Epstein, supra note 128, at IO<Hll. 
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compels the [designated college or university collection group] to 
track and review daily all currently open and pending 
investigations for the addition of new information, the re-
determination of acuity, and the development of action plans as 
related to updated information.278 
Whatever information-sharing protocols arc suggested or designed by a 
work group, they have two crucial tasks: First, to gather the information 
about particular threats or violent students before an event; and second, to 
share information on campus in case an event actually takes place. The 
latter is typically an adjunct of a good emergency preparedness program, 
which is discussed below. However, the collection, compilation, and 
collation of information of those students who pose threats of either "run-
of-the-mill" campus violence or calamitous events are tasks that might be 
best centralized by a campus threat assessment team. 279 
C. Threat Assessment Teams280 
The Virginia Tech Report was adamant in its recommendation that 
higher education institutions create threat assessment teams.281 Threat 
assessment teams arc integral to "identifying, assessing, and managing 
individuals who might pose a risk of violence to an identified or 
identifiable target."282 The threat assessment team is a standing committee 
with the training and expertise to assess threats in a multidisciplinary 
approach. Members of such group should include administrators, law 
278. iLLINOIS RFPORT, supra note 63, at 177. 
279. WISCONSI' REPORT, supra note 5, at 61-64. 
280. 
All campuses have or should have some system in place for handling the 
discipline or judicial problems and the psychological problems of students. 
The issue often becomes one of insufficient coordination, tnadequate 
mformation flow, and lack of a shared process .... The group responstble 
for such coordination is usually termed campus intervention team, but is 
equally effective by any other name .... 
John H. Dunkle, Zachary B. Silverstem, & Scott L. Warner, Managing Violent and 
Other Troubltng Students: The Role of Threat Assessment Teams on Campus, 34 J.C. & 
U.L. 585, 590 (2008) (quoting DEALI\,0 WITH THE BEHAVIORAL Al'\1) PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PROBIT\1S OF STUDENTS, NFW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES 9 (Ursula Delworth 
ed., 1989)). Some campuses may instead usc a consultative case management model to 
collect information on and provtde interventions for students who arc dangerous or in 
distress. Tribbensee, supra note 251 , at 415-16. 
281. VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 19; see also Shane R. Jimerson 
Stephen E. Brock, Jennifer L. Greif, & Katherine C. Cowan, Threat Assessment at 
School: A Primer for Educators, in HELPIF\G CHILDREN AT HO\iE MTI SCHOOL II: 
HANDOUTS FOR fA\11LIES AND EDl:CATORS S9-49 (AndreaS. Canter, Leslie Z. Page, 
Mark D. Roth, lvonne Romero, & Servio A. Carroll eds., 2004), available at 
http:/· www. nasponl ine.orgjresources!cnsis_safety/threatassess. pdf; COLtruBINE 
REPORT, supra note II , at xvii; ILLIKOIS REPORT, supra note 63, at 174-81 . 
282. SECRET SERVICE GUIDr, supra note II, at 30. 
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enforcement, mental health professionals, legaJ counsel, disability 
specialists, and student affairs officers.283 Public schools have adapted to 
the use of threat assessment teams for some time; higher education 
institutions find themselves playing catch-up.284 
According to the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of 
Education, six principles arc involved in threat assessment: 
Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, 
and oftentimes discernible, process of thinking and 
behavior .... 
Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the 
person, the situation, the setting, and the target .... 
An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is criticaJ to 
successful threat assessment .... 
Effective threat assessment is based on facts, rather than 
characteristics or "traits." ... 
An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat 
assessment investigation .... 
The central question of a threat assessment is whether a 
student poses a threat, not whether the student made a 
threat.285 
Therefore, several enumerated goals of such a group should include 1) 
developing policies and procedures for the group; 2) serving as campus 
consultants; 3) training campus members about the group's role and the 
process for sharing information; 4) determining the best confluence of 
assessment systems for problematic students; 5) working on appropriate 
intervention techniques for students; 6) periodically reviewing its 
283. Dunkle, Silverstein, & Warner, supra note 280, at 592-95, 634. Such group 
might also include academics in their specialty areas, such as criminal justice and 
psychology. See, e.g., Fairleigh Dickinson University, Threat Assessment Team, 
http://view.fdu.edu/default.aspx?id=3705 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
284. Dunkle, Silverstein, & Warner, supra note 280, at 589; see, e.g., Los Angeles 
Unified School District, Threat Assessment, http://notebook.lausd.net/portaV 
page? _pageid=33,259504&_dad=ptl&_schema=PTL_EP (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
Several colleges and universities have implemented threat assessment teams since the 
Virginia Tech events, including University of Kentucky, Boston University, University 
of Utah, University of Illinois-Chicago, and University of Minnesota. Associated 
Press, Colleges Keep Watch over Troubled Students, MSNBC, Mar. 28, 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/2384 751 0/; Ahnalese Rushmann, Threat-Assessment 
Groups Cropping Up Nationwide: Schools Are Taking More Caution With Students in 
Response to Virginia Tech, MINN. DAILY, Apr. 4, 2008, available at 
http://www.rnndaily.com/articles/ 2008/04/04/72166478. Virginia Tech appointed its 
Threat Assessment Team on December 10, 2007. Memorandum from Charles W. 
Steger to All Virginia Tech Employees and Students (Jan. 31, 2008) (on file at 
http://www.policies. vt.edulpolicymemos/pprn251.pdf). 
285. SECRET SERVICE GUJDE, supra note 11, at 30-33 (emphasis in original); see 
generally O'TOOLE, supra note II. 
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assessments of problematic students; 7) monitoring problematic students;286 
and 8) assessing specific threatening events. 
This last goal would give the group "vortex" responsibilities "to assess 
the incident(s) and information and carry out the appropriate response":287 
"The team should be empowered to take actions such as additional 
investigation, gathering background information, identification of 
additional dangerous warning signs, establishing a threat potential risk 
level ( l to 1 0) for a case, preparing a case for hearings (for instance, 
commitment hearings), and disseminating warning information."288 When 
calamitous violence is threatened, it is usually by an avenging "insider" of 
whom there are "warning signs of the impending violence and frequently 
other persons [are] aware of the perpetrator's intentions. The warning 
signs may include verbal threats, written threats, suicidal behavior, 
disturbing writings, self-produced videos and/or internet 
communications."289 Of course. all threats should be taken seriously.290 
But the team's centralized information-sharing capacity would allow it to 
examine all reports carefully and thoughtfully, allowing it to evaluate the 
viability of a threat by examining the "specific, plausible details" of the 
threat; "the emotional content" of the threat; and the "precipitating 
stressors."291 This task would also require that the team's role and function 
286. Dunkle, Silverstein, & Warner, supra note 280, at 591- 92. 
287. NAAG REPORT, supra note 158, at 3. 
288. VtROINIA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 19; see also ILL.INOIS REPORT, supra 
note 63, at 177 78. 
289. NAAG REPORT, supra note 158, at 2-3. The NAAG Report emphasized the 
genesis of multtple-murder events in schools and on campuses: 
In virtually all the incidents of school and campus violence that have 
occurred in America thus far, the perpetrator or perpetrators have 
been what experts have identified as "avengers," people who arc 
responding to a real or percetved injustice and seeking vengeance. 
Most of the perpetrators have been "malevolent insiders," students 
or ~chool personnel known by the school or other students. 
!d. at 2; see also Sarah E. Redfield, Threats Made, Threats Posed: School and Judicial 
Analysis in Need of Redirection, 2003 BYU Eouc. & L.J. 663, 712 20 (2003) 
(cxarninmg threat assessment strategies in public schools). 
290. O'TOOLE, supra note II, at 6. 
291 . /d. at 7- 8. An evaluative guide from the US. Secret Service is invaluable to 
compile and assess the information about panicular students of mterest, evaluating such 
behavior as the student's motives, communications, inappropriate interest in school 
attacks and weapons, and recent experiences of depression or loss. SECRET SERVICe 
GliDF., wpra note II. at 55 57. A handy checklist mtght also prove useful for 
reporting suspicious events. See, e.g., Eleven Questions to Guide Data Collection in a 
Threat Assessment Inquiry, http://www.pent.ca.gov//thr/llqucstions.pdf (last visited 
Feb 28, 2009); Purdue University Calumet Threat Assessment Checklist, 
http://webs.calumet.purdue.edu/hr/files/2008/0 llthrcat.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
However, caution should be exercised to avoid turning checklists into student profiling. 
Legal concerns as well as the arbitrariness of profihng checklists mmtate against any 
procedure that would penalize and stigmatize studen~ but not serve as an adequate tool 
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be highly publicized on campus for both faculty and student usc.292 
The group should meet regularly and not just for the purpose of 
identifying immediate threats. Those regular meetings should address not 
only issues of violence and threats but also "increased awareness, 
measurement, prioritization, needs assessment, causal evaluation, target 
hardening and early intervention."293 The team can also offer substantive 
input into alleviating a culture of campus violence by creating pro-active 
policies to address alcohol abuse and sexual assault. 294 Such systemic 
changes should embrace a coherent protocol for information gathering in 
which information would then be funneled to the team after training and 
coordination with faculty, residence hall staff, the student disciplinary 
organization, and the campus counseling ccntcr.295 In addition, the team 
could implement policies that would provide appropriate support systems 
for students in distress, reduce bullying on campus, and embrace an 
"integrated systems approach" for utilizing the university's various 
departments in trust and collaboration. 296 
D. Campus Mental Health 
Details on how to improve mental health treatment on campuses arc 
beyond the scope of this Article but should surely be a consideration by a 
campus violence work group. The problems dealing with mentally 
distressed and mentally disabled students were a high priority in nearly all 
the reports conducted after the events at Virginia Tech because the 
perpetrator was failed by campus mental health services.297 Ironically, the 
mentally ill student is more likely to be the victim of violence on campus 
for actually assessing student danger. E.g., Gayle Tronvig Carper, Merry Rhoades, & 
Steven Rirtcnmcycr, in Search ofK/ebo/d's Ghost: Investigating the Legal Ambigurties 
of Violent Student Profiling, 174 Eouc. L. REP. 793, 807 (2003 ). 
292. See, e.g., Fairleigh Dickenson University, supra note 283; West Chester 
University Department of Public Safety, Threat Assessment Team, 
http://www.weupa.edu/dps/emergencyrrhreatAssessment.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 
2009). This publication should include the professional schools too, such as medical 
and law schools. 
293. Fairleigh Dickinson University, supra note 283. 
294. !d. 
295. VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note l, at 53 54. 
296. ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 63, at 176-77. 
297. 'The Cook Counseling Center and the University's Care Team failed to 
provide needed support and services to Cho during a period in late 2005 and early 
2006. The system failed for lack of resources, incorrect interpretation of privacy laws, 
and passivity. Records of Cho's minimal treatment at Virginia Tech's Cook 
Counseling Center are missing." VIRGINIA TECII REPORT, supra note I, at 2. Several 
post-event reports focused on improvement to student mental health. CALIFOR.'\IA 
REPORT, supra note 178, at 16-22; ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 63, at 13-33; 
OKLAHOMA REPORT, supra note 40, at 45-50; REPORT TO THE PRESIDE!\!, supra note 
!58, at 14- 15; WISCONSI'\REPORT, supra note 5, at 21- 24. 
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than vice versa.298 
The considered consensus is that mental health treatment on campuses is 
inadcquate.299 A lawyer's role in these issues requires being conversant in 
the federal statutes governing disabilities as well as in individual states' 
laws regulating mental health treatment and involuntary commitment 
proccdurcs.300 Clearly discernible goals for student mental health on 
college and university campuses include the creation and maintenance of 
on-campus counseling centers or some alternative provision through 
contractual agreements.301 On-campus services should adhere to the 
standards of the International Association of Counseling Services.302 In 
addition, existing campus counseling centers should develop a relationship 
with the nearest county or state entity.303 Peer mental health support 
groups are also encouraged, which could accompany an alcohol abuse 
network.304 
Unfortunately, there is onl) so much that an individual institution can do 
if there is a funding problem for student services.305 The complicated 
mechanisms for starting or even upgrading campus mental health facilities 
may be beyond the capacity of a work group other than making 
recommendations. Furthermore, some of the issues involving mental health 
law and policy require legislative intervention, not just local planning. 
Nevertheless, a campus violence task force must at least address the 
weaknesses and strengths of its current campus mental health services.306 
298. WISCO'lSIN REPORT, supra note 5, at 21. 
299. E.g, 0Kl.AHOMA RfPORT, supra note 40, at II; WISCOSSI'I RFPORT, supra 
note 5, at 21. Part of the problem is that more students are attendmg college wtth pre-
existmg mental health problems. !d.; CARR, supra note 67, at 8; Karin McAnaney, 
Note, Finding tlte Proper Balance. Protecting Suicidal Swdents without Harming 
Universities, 94 VA. L. REv. 197, 202 (2008). And colleges and un1versities in general 
are experiencing a senous up-tick m the number of students with psychological 
problems, whether pre-ex1stmg or recently emergent while on campus. See generally 
Barbara A. Lee & Gail E. Abbey, College and University Students with Mental 
Disabilities: Legal and Policy Issues, 34 J.C. & U.L. 349 (2008); McAnaney, supra 
note 299, at 202. On average, nearly three college students a day are committing 
suicide. McAnaney, supra note 299, at 202. 
300. See generally Lee & Abbey, supra note 299, at 349. 
301. ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 63, at 15-16; NEV. JERSEY REPORT, supra note 
159, at 6-9; OHIO REPORT, ~upra note 159, at 134-36; OKLAHOMA REPORT, supra note 
40, at 14. 
302. ILLII\OIS RrPORT, supra note 63, at 15-16; International Association of 
Counseling Services, lnc., Accreditation Standards for Unhersity and College 
Counseling Centen,, http://www.lacsinc.org/IACS%20STANDARDS.pdf (last visited 
Feb.28,2009) 
303. OHIO REPORT, supra note 159, at 2. 
304. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 159, at vi; OKLAHOMA REPORT, supra note 40, at 
II; WISCO,SI\1 RtPOR r, supra note 5, at 23. 
305. 0KLAH0\otA REPORT, supra note 40, at 12. 
306. Campus mental health capabtht1es will also be tested m the wake of disaster. 
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E. Emergency Preparedness 
Emergency preparedness is not the same function as served by a threat 
assessment team. Emergency planning includes both prevention and what 
to do when a crisis occurs, despite the best efforts, best practices, and best 
threat assessment team a campus has assembled. At the very basic level, 
state Jaw often requires that campuses provide emergency measures in 
cases of tornado, hurricane, or other such natural disasters.307 At the same 
time, campuses must prepare for calamitous events like the mass shootings 
that occurred at Virginia Tech and Northern lllinois.308 
All colleges and universities should conduct a threat and 
vulnerability assessment as part of the institutional risk 
management strategy. The assessment should consider the 
full spectrum of threat (i.e., natural, criminal, terrorist, 
accidental, etc.) for the campus. The results of this 
assessment should guide the institution 's application of 
protective measures and emergency planning 
assumptions.309 
Five general principles should guide the task force when addressing 
emergency preparedness: 
Establish an effective planning process 
Establish cross-institutional teams to build support 
Use all-hazards planning to anticipate changing needs 
T nclude a crisis communications component 
VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 135-47. An improved organization scheme 
on campus may improve the delivery of services to the student body as a whole in the 
aftermath. See generally Catherine H. Stein, Craig J. Vickio, Wendy R. Fogo, & 
Kristen M. Abraham, Making Connections: A Network Approach to University 
Disaster Preparedness, 48 1. or COLL. STL'DE~ DEV. 331 (2007). 
307. E.g., GAO EMERGE!\CY MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 177, at 11, 57-58; 
NAAG REPORT, supra note 158, at 7. 
/d. at 8. 
States should consider requiring that all schools and colleges, as a 
conditiOn of receiving state funding, create, maintain, and update 
emergency management plans. These schools and colleges should 
be required to conduct exercises, to mclude lockdown drills if 
appropriate, no less than annually and the state should establish 
audit mechanisms to ensure compliance with these reqUirements. 
Such exercises should involve students, faculty, staff, first 
responders, and other community stakeholders. 
308. See generally LAWRENCE K. PETTIT, A\.ffiRICAt-. ASS'N OF STATE COLL. AND 
UNIV., EXPECTII\G THE U~EXPECTED: LESSO!\S FR0~1 THE VIRGINIA TECH TRAGEDY 
(2007). 
309. IACLEA BLL"EPRIVI', supra note 67, at 5; see also NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra 
note 159, at 2-4; NEW MEXlCO REPORT, supra note 159, at 3-4; OHIO REPORT, supra 
note 159, at 134-36; VIRGINIA TECH INFRASTRuCTURE REPORT, supra note 158. 
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Maintain a phased and progressive planning cycle310 
In addition, each emergency plan for higher education institutions should 
have four phases: prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery. 311 The first-prevention-mitigation-assesses safety and security 
in the campus environment to decrease the likelihood of the calamity's 
occurring or, barring that, of reducing the number of casualties. Second, 
preparedness anticipates the implementation of protocols in campuses and 
constituent departments for a coordinated response to an emergency. 
Third, the response phase should effectively resolve or at least contain an 
event. Last, the recovery phase deals with the post-event services and 
procedures to restore operations on campus.312 
Specific recommendations for the Virginia Tech type of emergency 
entail several best practices identified by the International Association of 
Campus Law Enforcement Administrators. First, the campus must assess 
its current capabilities of dealing with all risks. 313 Second is the utilization 
of an effective communication system to notify students, faculty, and staff. 
A redundant system-one with both low- and high-tech capabilities-is a 
minimum necessity: loud speakers in conjunction with a mass-notification 
system, such as voice-mail, e-mail and text-messaging.314 And the 
authority to send out emergency communications should be distributed 
among a handful of people so warnings may be issued without decision by 
committee.315 Third, campuses should pattern their emergency 
310. STEVE CHARVAT, COLLI:.GE AND UNIVERSITY DISASTER PLAN"'ING: NEW 
GUJD[LINES BASED 0 COMMON iNDUSTRY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 3 (n.d.), 
http://www.higheredcenter.org/files/documents/college-disaster-planning.pdf. 
Common characteristics of comprehensive emergency preparedness plans at college 
and university campuses include coherent organizations; ability to recognize multiple 
threats; capacity to assist multiple victims or targets; preventive as well as responsive 
measures; effective emergency communications; comprehensive on-campus training 
and education: and annual updating. Delight E. Champagne, Elements of a 
Comprehensive Safety Plan, in CREATING AND MAINTAINI'-0 SAFE COLLEGE 
CAMPUSES, supra note 64, at 261, 263. 
311. U.S. Dep' t of Educ. Emergency Response & Crisis Mgmt. Technical 
Assistance Ctr., Emergency Management Planning for Institutions of Higher 
Education, HELPFUL HINTS FOR SCHOOL EMERGEI\CY MANAGEMENT 2007, at 3, 
available at http://rems.ed.gov/views/documents/Hll_ Vol21ssue6.pdf [hereinafter 
HELPfUL HINTS). 
312. !d. at 3-5. 
313. IACLEA BLUEPRINT, supra note 67, at 5. 
314. !d.; NAAG REPORT, supra note 158, at 9- 10; VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra 
note I , at 19. Public warning devices should also have distinguishable signals so that 
the campus community will be able to differentiate among warnings, such as a tornado 
versus a campus shooting. !d. at 18; see generally Champagne, supra note 31 0, at 268-
69; CALIFORNlA REPORT, supra note 178, at 8-9; 0KLAH0\1A REPORT, supra note 40, at 
10. 
315. See HELPFUL HI!\'TS, supra note 311, at 2; lACLEA BLUEPRINT, supra note 67, 
at 5; VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 19. 
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management plans on the procedures provided by the National Incident 
Management System and the Department of Homeland Security, having 
been developed by experts for just such unexpected events.316 Fourth, the 
emergency management plans must be updated both legally and practically, 
including conducting regular exercises for both the emergency personnel 
and for the campus inhabitants.317 Fifth, campuses should strengthen their 
partnerships with local government agencies.318 And last, campus police 
should be provided First Responder training.319 
Regardless of their efforts today, colleges and universities will become 
answerable for their emergency preparedness procedures if Congress 
amends the Higher Education Act of 1965 with the pending Virginia Tech 
Victims Campus Emergency Response Policy and Notification Act.320 
Introduced the week before the first anniversary of the events at Virginia 
Tech, this Act will add to the disclosures that higher education institutions 
must give students, particularly information concerning campus safety and 
security.321 In particular, the Act would require disclosures of current 
emergency preparedness procedures, which must include thirty-minute 
campus communication capacity, annual training to students and faculty, 
and annual tests on these procedures. 322 
F. Campus Police 
Although the Virginia Tech Report was in general laudatory toward the 
work of the campus police, it still made some recommendations for 
upgrading campus security forces in order to handle the catastrophic 
emergencies created by the mass shootings. Other reports similarly 
suggested that higher education institutions be attentive to updating and 
resourcing their campus security forces.323 
The overwhelming suggestion is that higher education institutions make 
sure that their campus security forces have appropriate training, such as 
Active Shooter training324 and First Responder training.325 These would 
316. JACLEA BLl:EPRI T, supra note 67, at 5; ILLI'OIS REPORT EXH'UIIVE 
SUMMARY, supra note 40, at 2. 
317. TACLEA BLUEPRINT, supra note 67, at 5; NAAG REPORT, supra note 158, at 
7; VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 19. 
318. 1ACLEA BLL.I:.PRINT,supra note 67, at 5-6. 
319. /d. at 6. 
320. H.R. 5735, I lOth Cong. § 2 (2008). 
321. The Act would amend 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006). 
322. H.R. 5735. 
323. These improvements would be a natural complement to the professional 
evolution of campus police departments in the past twenty years. See Peak, Barthe, & 
Garcia, supra note 127, at 255- 56. 
324. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 178, at 9-1 0; FLORIDA RFPORT, supra note 
159, at ix; VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note I, at 19-20. 
325. FLORIDA RFPORT, supra note 159, at 10-11; IACLEA BLUFPRINI, supra note 
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seem to at least serve as a palliative measure for similar disasters. The 
campus security force should also be a member of a threat assessment 
team. And there should be close coordination with local police agencies.326 
"Understanding the concerns of both the internal and external communities 
and addressing problems collaboratively are key to effective policing. "327 
Of course, the long-term goal would be to have accredited, full-service, 
sworn law enforcement agencies on campus.328 However, the practicalities 
of funding may be difficult even for state colleges and universities, much 
less private institutions. So the short-term goals should at least include 
better integration into the informational process on campus, educational 
efforts, and improved emergency preparedness.329 
VI. RECONSTITUTION 
When the task force's work is over, the enculturation of the campus is 
just beginning. A constant mantra throughout the post-Virginia Tech 
literature is that, whatever procedures and protocols a higher education 
institution might adopt, those procedures and protocols must be marketed, 
advertised, posted, practiced and drilled within the campus community.330 
There is no suggestion that campuses should become armed camps or 
fortresses, by any means. "There is often conflict between the need for 
security and maintaining an open environment. Freedom of thought and 
expression are cherished, and many institutions of higher education have 
minimal controls over campus access due to their commitment to an open 
environment."331 Nonetheless, the student consumer expects safety and 
security when on campus and, when things go awry, is not likely to take 
responsibility. 
67, at 6; NEW MEXICO REPORT, supra note 159, at 5. 
326. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 159, at 9; AAG REPORT, supra note 158, at 8; 
PETIIT, supra note 308, at 4; WISCO'\SI"' REPORT, supra note 5, at 68. 
327. James A. Perrotti, The Role of the Campus Police and Security Department in 
the 21st Century: An Essay Based on 30 Years of Experience, in CREATI'G A'ID 
MAI'lTAINING SAFE Col LEGE CAMPliSES, supra note 67, at 173, 187. 
328. E.g., FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 159, at 1x; IACLEA BLUEPRINT, supra note 
67, at 6; NEW MEXICO REPORT, supra note 159, at 5; W!SCO><Sl'l R FPOR I. supra note 5, 
at 66-68. 
329. Bryan J. Reaves. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Campus 
Law Enforcement, 2004-o5, NCJ 219374, at 7-8, 16-17 (2008), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov.'bjs/pub/pdf/cle0405.pdf. 
330. E.g., MISSOURI REPORT, supra note 159, at 9- 10. Literature on public school 
safety after the tragedy at Columbine High School advises that a supportive school 
culture is crucial to implementing effective safety procedures. E.g., Ethan Heinen, Jaci 
Webb-Dempsey, Lucas C. Moore, Craig S. McClellan, & Cari H. Friebel, 
Implementing District Safety Standards at the Site Level, 190 NASSP BULL. 207, 215-
18 (2006). 
331. Perrotti, supra note 327, at 173-74. 
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College and university campuses are safer than the country at large.332 
In fact, students are more likely to be victimized off campus than on, 
especially when engaged in off-campus leisure activities.333 One should 
not, however, be sanguine about that comparison of these two disparate 
crime rates for a couple of reasons. First, campus crime tends to be 
underreported.U4 Second, validity and reliability of the comparison itself 
are questionable: Can one really compare the environment of a college or 
university campus with the nation at large when it comes to crime 
statistics? Perhaps a more accurate analysis would be to compare the 
campus crime rate with the surrounding neighborhood.335 Indeed, perhaps 
the location of the campus in that neighborhood increases the crime 
statistics. 
In addition, students and their parents typically anticipate a much safer 
environment than the country at large. They likely anticipate, or at least 
hope, that the campus will be just as safe as their own neighborhoods. 
indeed, higher education institutions intend to convey the notion that 
campuses are idyllic oases for students to learn and grow even if they are 
surrounded by fences and bad neighborhoods.336 What they do not expect 
is that the vast majority of campus perpetrators come from within. 
Consequently, crime on campus is a new and startling experience for 
students and their parents. 
Unfortunately, students are "poor guardians of themselves and their 
property, despite the fact that many schools require freshmen and transfer 
students to participate in a general crime prevention awareness program or 
in a program devoted to a specific topic, such as rape awareness."337 There 
332. Fisher, Hartman, Cullen, & Turner, supra note 66, at 80; D.O.E. 2001 REPORT 
TO CONGRESS, supra note 66, at 5, 7, 8. The D.O.E. statistics arc somewhat misleading 
because the calcuJatlons of "on-campus" crimes were based on a narrower reporting 
paradigm than is currently employed, which now includes off-campus but related 
crimes since 1999. !d. at 10. After 1999, campus cnme numbers were more than five 
times higher than the 200 I Report suggests. !d. at II. 
333. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 67, at 5-Q. But see Fisher. Sloan, Cullen, & Lu, 
supra note 65, at 692-93. Some crimes are more likely to occur on campus than off 
campus, espectally sexual and simple assaults. /d. 
334. Siegel & Raymond, supra note 65, at 19; CARR, supra note 67, at 383. 
335. A small study of Florida's state colleges and universities reveals that the crime 
rate on campuses, as reported on the state's Uniform Crime Reports for 1989 and 1990, 
was lower than the city and county wherein the respcchve schools were located. Max 
L. Bromley, Campus and Community Crime Rate Comparisons: A Statewide Study, 15 
J. OF SECURITY ADM1N. 49, 54 ( 1992). And a large-scale study of 416 higher education 
instttuttons found no crime spill-over from surrounding communities or counties. 
Volkwein, Szelest, & Lizotte, supra note 66, at 666 67. Neither study, however, 
appeared to compare the crime rates of the immediately surrounding neighborhoods. 
Bromley, supra note 335, at 55-56. 
336. Oren R. Griffen, Confronting the Evolving Safety and Security Challenge at 
Colleges and Universities, 5 PlERCE L. REV. 413, 432 (2006 {)7). 
337. Fisher, Sloan, Cullen, & Lu, supra note 65, at 680; Volkwem, Szelest, & 
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may be any number of reasons for this phenomenon. One of those reasons 
may be the consumers' expectation that the campus will be safe and that 
the responsibility for that safety rests on the college or university itself, 
with no concomitant commitment from the students. Another reason may 
well be the failure of maturity and risk-taking behavior in which students 
engage that provoke and even invite campus violence. A third reason may 
be a confluence of the two, a campus culture that encourages students to 
feel secure without actually making them responsible for doing so.338 Both 
the consumers and the institutions have been complicit in not 
acknowledging crime on campus.339 The post-Virginia Tech campus must 
alter that relationship by giving more than lip-service to occasional notices 
and explanations of campus violence and campus security, to both students 
and campus staff. 
The trend toward greater information to the consumer students and 
parents was Congress's enactment of the Clery Act, which at the very least 
alerted the general public to the fact that there is crime on college 
campuses.340 The Clery Act the Crime Awareness and Campus Security 
Act341-is a 1990 amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1965 and 
requires colleges and universities to report annual statistics of crimes 
occurring on or ncar what is traditionally considered the "campus."342 The 
Lizotte, supra note 66, at649. 
338. College and university students arc being increasingly left to their own devices 
in matters of creatmg the1r own Identities and making their own decisions with little 
adult intervention. As a consequence, peer influence plays a leading role in shapmg 
their Identities. Peer influence also plays a leading role in risk-takmg and illegal 
behavior. Jean M. Low, David Williamson, & Jean Cottingham, Predictors of 
Umversity Student l.,awbrealdng Behaviors, 45 J. OF COLL. STUot.NT Dtv. 535, 535 
(2004). 
339. "[T]o some extent administrators, parents, employees, and students simply 
[do) not want to acknowledge that problems exist[] in places that should perhaps be 
resistant to such social malaise." Don Hummer, Sertous Cnminality at U.S. Colleges 
and Universities: An Application of the Situational Perspective, 15 CRIM. JUSTICE 
POL'Y REv. 391, 391 (2004). Another significant hindrance in understanding this 
problem is that the study of college crime is of relatively recent vintage. E.g .. Fisher, 
Sloan, Cullen, & Lu, supra note 65, at 672; MAX L. BRO'vtLEY, CAMPt:S-RI:LATED 
'\1l RDI:.RS: A CO"iTFNT ANALYSIS REVU:W OF NEWS ARTICLES 12 (2005), a~·atfah/e at 
http: www .dcf.state. fl.us campusSecunty/docs/Ca mpus_ Re lated_Murders050907. pdf. 
340. Hummer, supra note 339, at 392. 
341. 20 u.s.c. § 1092(f) (2006). 
342. E.g., KAPLIN & LEE, supra note 44, at 885; Fisher, Hartman, Cullen, & Turner, 
supra note 66, at 61-62; Security on Campus, Inc., Clery Act Legislative History 
( 1989 2000), http://www.securityoncampus.orglindex.php?opllon t com_ content& 
view=article&id=300:clery-act-legislatiYc-history-1989-2000&cattd=64:cleryact (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2009). Those locations arc campus property (bmldmgs and property 
owned and controlled by the university), non-campus property (buildings and property 
run by recognized student organization!> and any other satellite buildmgs owned by the 
institution and used by students but not reasonably contiguous to campus), and public 
property (stdewalks, streets and parking facilities) adjacent to campus or other facility 
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Act was named after Jeanne Clery, a nineteen-year-old Lehigh University 
student who was tortured, raped, sodomized and murdered by a fellow 
student who gained access to her dormitory room through propped-open 
doors. 343 The Act was intended to increase student awareness of criminal 
activity on campus344 and thereby make the students safer.345 As a 
consequence, higher education institutions must annually report the number 
of incidents of murder, forcible and nonforcible sex offenses, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, manslaughter, and arson 
that occur on or adjacent to their prccincts.346 Unfortunately, the reported 
numbers indicate that campus crime is on the increase, perhaps because the 
manner of gathering statistics has been erratic;347 perhaps because colleges 
and universities arc not doing a very good job of distributing the statistics 
to their students;~8 perhaps because few students are paying attention to the 
published statistics;349 or, more troubling, perhaps because schools arc not 
fully disclosing their crime numbers.350 
controlled by the mstitut10n. 20 U.S.C. § 1 092(t)(6)(A). The Clery Act also acts as the 
all-campus warnmgs for ongoing crimes. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T Of EDUC., OFF. or 
POSTSECONDARY [DU\., THE HANDBOOK FOR CAMPUS CRL'ff REPORTI'-G 13-17 
(2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook-part-l.pdf 
[hereinafter D O.L. HANDBOOK FOR CAMPUS CRI\1E]; see also Enc Hoover & Sara 
Lipka, College~ Weigh ~t'hen to Alert Students of Danger, CHR0'-1. OF HIGHER Eouc. 
(Wash., D.C.), Dec. 7, 2007, at Al. 
343. Constance B. Clery, Fon-.·ard, in CREATII\G MD MANTAINING SAI'E COlt EGE 
CAMPlisr.s, supra note 64, at ix; Howard Clery & Connie Clery, What Jeanne Didn't 
Know, http://www.sccurityoncampus.org/-securixO/index.php?option com_content& 
vicw=article&id 52&Jtemid=66 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
344. E.g, Gregory & Janosik, supra note 127, at 7-8. 
345. F1sher, Hartman, Cullen, & Turner, supra note 66, at 71. 
346. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(l)(F)(i) (2006); see D.O.E. HANDBOOK FOR CAI\fPUS 
CRIME, supra note 342, at 23-48. Some states also require colleges and urtiversities to 
report campus cnmc statistics. KAPLDI & LEE, supra note 44, at 887; Fisher, supra 
note 127, at 96-98. 
347. Fisher, Hartman, Cullen, & Turner, supra note 66. at 77 78. 
348. E.g., Gregory & Janos1k, supra note 127, at 40-44, 46. 
349 !d. at 46; Pamela Wilcox, Carol E. Jordan, & Adam J Pntchard, A 
Multidimensional Exammation of Campus Safety: Viclllnization, Perceptrons of 
Danger, Worry About Crime, and Precautionat)' Behavtor Among College Women in 
the Post-Clery Era, 53 CRI\o1E & Dr::uNQ. 219, 247 (2007). 
350. See, e.g., Letter from Mary E. Gust, U.S. Department of Education, to Dr. 
Donald Loppnow, Executive Vice President, Eastern Mich1gan University (Dec. 14, 
2007) (on file at http://blog.rnlive.com/annarbornews/2007/ 12/DOE003.pdf) 
(concerning Eastern Michigan's violations of the Clcry Act, includmg efTorts to 
conceal from the greater campus that a student was murdered and the failure to 
accurately report crime statistics). The U.S. Department of Education imposed a 
$357,000 fmc on Eastern Michigan University for its failure to report a VIolation of the 
Clery Act. Press Release, Security on Campus, Inc., Eastern M1chtgan University 
Faces Largest Fver Jeanne Clery Act Fine of $357,000 (Dec. 18, 2007), (on file at 
http:/tww\v.securityoncampus.org/update/ 121807 .html). Liab1hty may attach to 
institutions that fail to adequately reveal crime statistics. For mstancc, a female student 
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The Clery Act is just one of several avenues that higher education 
institutions need use to educate and train their students about campus 
violence. Without that education and training, the institution will have 
difficulty changing the culture that breeds 80% of the perpetrators. Being 
forthright about crime statistics may not necessarily be a good marketing 
tool for colleges and universities, 35 but all the more reason to make 
institutional efforts to lower the statistics so as to avoid the headline-
grabbing catastrophic event or wave of campus crime.m 
Just as the Clery Act requires the publication of crime statistics, the 
campus violence work force must work to "market" its safety aspects. 
Because the Clery Act will likely be amended with the passage of the 
Virginia Tech Victims Act, disclosure of emergency preparedness 
precautions and procedures is a foregone conclusion. But these are just two 
aspects of the publication that should occur on campus to instill a culture of 
both awareness and responsibility. The campus community also must be 
annually reminded of the student discipline code and its attendant 
procedures; of the campus facilities for mental health; of the operations of 
the threat assessment team and its information-gathering role, perhaps 
including student anonymity; and of any campus-wide initiatives designed 
to decrease campus violence, such as sexual assaults, alcohol, drugs and 
weapons. 353 Appropriate training protocols should be implemented for the 
campus community, especially for the faculty and staff.354 And this should 
include all the affiliated schools, like law schools and medical colleges. 
at California State University-San Diego was raped and murdered m her donn room. 
Her mother's wrongful death lawsUit was allowed to proceed on several grounds, one 
of which was negligent misrepresentation because the university failed to warn her that 
there was an escalation in the number of rapes and attacks on female students, and the 
mother and daughter specifically relied on that misrepresentation to their detriment. 
Duarte v. State, 88 Cal. App. 3d 473 ( 1979); see also Murrell v. Mount St. Clare Coli., 
No. 3:00-CV-90204, 2001 WL 1678766, at *6-7 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2001). Mount 
St. Clare College, sued in the latter case, was fmed $25,000 for failing to comply with 
the reporting requirements under the Clery Act. KAPLI'\ & LEE, supra note 44, at 887. 
351. See, e.g. , Volkwein, Szelest, & Lizotte, supra note 66, at 648. 
352. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Drumbeat of Shots, Broken by Pauses to Reload, N.Y. 
TiMES, APRIL 17, 2007, at AI; Gregory, supra note II; Tony Perry, How the Police 
Busted a College Drug Scene: Young Cops Blended into Fraternity Houses at San 
Diego State and Netted 75 Students, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at I; Peter Schwonn, 
Violence Rattles UMass Campus: Spate of Attacks, Rowdiness, Crimtnal Acts in 
Amherst Raises Concerns, BOSTO'- GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2008, at lA; Duquesne U. 
Shooting Victims Claim NBA Dreams Dashed in Lawsuit, 
THEPITISBUROHCHANNEL.COM, June 23, 2008, 
http://www.thepittsburghchannel.com/education/16676524/detail.html?rss=pit&psp=ne 
ws (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). 
353. IACLEA BLUEPRINT, supra note 67, at 7. 
354. For example, the rise of binge-drinking on campus may be directly related to 
the absence of significant interaction between students and campus adults. Siegel & 
Raymond, supra note 65, at 24. 
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The goal is not to make the campus culture paranoid a Ia post-9/ 11 but to 
created educated risk managers and thereby good consumers. 
Vll. AND WHEN I DIE, AND WilEN I'M DEAD, DEAD AND GONE, THERE'LL 
BE ONE CHILD BOR.~ ... . JSS 
One of lawyers' chief skills is warning of risks and trying to get the 
client to engage in behavior that will avoid risk. For this reason, a lawyer 
is critical to the process of auditing, changing and implementing procedures 
to address campus violence. She must be a part of policymaking, inserting 
herself as one with the academic vision and not on a solo mission. On the 
other hand, the lawyer engaged before the fact or who tries to take charge is 
likely to make the academic community susp1C1ous, definitely 
uncooperative and perhaps thoroughly disengaged. When the lawyer is 
engaged after the fact, it is too late: the academic community has become 
too entrenched in its educational mission and views any changes the lawyer 
makes with resentment. Neither of these scenarios is likely to encourdge an 
enculturation to eliminate campus violence if the adult portion of the 
campus community has disconnected. Indeed, the lawyer cannot 
enculturate without the assistance of the academic community who has to 
buy into the program. Perhaps more important, however, is that the 
academic community can put the brakes on legal efforts to saturate higher 
education in a culture of risk management. 356 Academics will have a better 
sense of how to get the community to embrace a culture opposed to 
violence than wi11 lawyers. Academics prefer carrots while lawyers seem 
to prefer sticks. 
Ultimately, however, the progeny of a project to review and change 
campus policies must be embraced by the students to be effective. The fall 
of in loco parentis was surely painful for campus administrations, given the 
unlawful student behavior during the Vietnam years. It is ironic then that 
what campus violence in the 1960s and 1970s wrought in the manner of 
open campus governance may be shrunk because the current student 
population does not seem to know what to do with those freedoms. Further 
irony is that the academics who remember that campus \iolencc of the 
355. Laura Nyro, And When I Die, as recorded by Blood Sweat & Tears. 011 B1 .ooo 
SWI:AT & TEARS (Columbia Records 1968). 
356. 
There is . . . a real danger m the risk-management programs of further 
insulating student life from the influences and provocations of the community 
in the name of sheltering tender subjectivities. The!.e tendencies may form a 
particularly insidious link with the victimolog1es promulgated as one aspect 
of contemporary ethnic polittcs on campus. One feature that many nsk-
management techniques have in common is that of channeling people into 
homogeneous "risk groups." Limiting risk is often taken to mean limiting the 
mtx of different people. 
Simon, supra note 41, at 37. 
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1960 and 1970s are likely those most vociferously opposed to a campus 
culture saturated with security measures and informers. The laV.)'er 
participating on a campus violence work force must have a deft hand in the 
reconstitution of the audited campus policies so as to create a \ iable and 
vibrant campus culture that reflects the institutional vitality necessary to 
achieve its educational goals. 
